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Supply, Demand, and Consequences: The Impact of
Information Flow on Individual Permitting Decisions Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
ALYSON C. FLOURNOY*
INTRODUCTION
By definition, effect-based health, safety, and environmental regulation depends
upon information about the effects on health, safety, or the environment of particular
substances or activities.' How much and what information the regulatory process
demands before an activity or substance is regulated or permitted, and what provisions
it makes to ensure the availability of this information are therefore critical questions. In
addition, every regulatory process must either implicitly or explicitly address the
question of what happens when the available informational supply fails to meet the
demand the statute creates. These explicit or implicit provisions that determine the
consequences of an information gap, while not appearing to affect substantive policy,
can have a significant effect on what policy is, in fact, implemented.2
Scholars who have studied health-protective chemical regulation statutes such as the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 3 have observed that the information flow under
regulatory statutes can create obstacles to protective regulation and may even distort
the structure of the scientific information generated under the statute. The source of
these problems in health-based regulation is frequently the combined effect of the
demand for information, the inadequate supply of information, and the legal
consequences that flow from a gap between data demand and supply.4 For example, in
* U.F. Research Foundation Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am
grateful to Rob Fischman and John Applegate for their thoughtful work organizing this
symposium and to Matt Brockway and Brenda Appledorn for their capable research assistance.
1. The subject of this paper and of most inquiry concerning information demands is effect-
based regulation, as opposed to technology-based regulation. One of the frequently noted
advantages of technology-based regulation is the different information demands it imposes. See
generally David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2005); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:
The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 41 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991).
2. The fact that a statute depends on and demands certain information does not always
mean that the information will be available or forthcoming. As Professor Wagner's work
demonstrates, the identity of the party who must generate the information on which regulation
depends, and the incentives and disincentives that party has to provide this information, are
critical to assessing the impact of information demands on the regulatory process. See generally
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure ofEnvironmental Law to Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619 (2004).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
4. See generally Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity:
Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795 (1989); Wagner, supra note
2 (arguing that unrealistic data expectations that ignore the incentive structure for generation of
the data create obstacles to protective regulation); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995) (documenting legal, political, and
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order to successfully implement a protective statutory mandate, such as the EPA's
mandate to protect public health from unreasonable risks under TSCA, or the
Occupational Safety and Health Acts's mandate to develop standards that are
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment,5 an
agency must first prove that a given substance causes unreasonable risks to health and
then provide sufficient scientific proof that a particular quantitative standard or
limitation is necessary to reduce the risk to a reasonable level.6 Often the most
probative scientific evidence on these points comprises controlled studies of animal
exposure to the relevant substance. Based on this evidence, inferences are drawn about
the impacts of exposure on humans.
7
A rich literature documents how judicial interpretation of demand provisions in
regulatory statutes impose unreasonable requirements on agencies, and details other
obstacles agencies face in obtaining the information necessary to support protective
regulation under TSCA and similar statutes. 8 Scholars have also highlighted the lack
of adequate public funding for basic research 9 and the disincentives the regulatory
system creates for information generation by private parties. 0 Finally, this literature
documents how, under many such statutes, the consequence of an inadequate supply of
information to meet the regulatory demand results in regulatory paralysis. 1' This body
of work provides strong support for the conclusion that the systems of supply and
demand for information under these statutes are poorly designed to achieve the goal of
protecting public health and safety.
One question raised by the organizers of this symposium is whether the same
obstacles to protective regulatory decisions exist under statutes that mandate protection
of natural resources, as opposed to public health. This paper focuses on a public trust
resource-wetlands-and examines an issue that has been studied primarily with
reference to health-based pollution-control statutes. This paper assesses whether
information gaps create an obstacle to successful regulation under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act (CWA or "the Act") as it applies to discharges of dredged and fill
material in wetlands.' 
2
institutional hurdles to protective regulatory decision making that create pressure for
unattainable scientific certainty). This dynamic is not limited to TSCA. Other health-based
pollution control statutes create the same dynamic.
5. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2006).
6. This approach is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1979). See also Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1223 (5th Cir. 1991).
7. See Wagner, supra note 4. While highly relevant, epidemiological studies are often not
available.
8. See generally Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk
Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 1; Wagner, supra
note 2; Wagner, supra note 4.
9. Wagner, supra note 2, at 1744-45.
10. Id. at 1678 (adverse regulatory consequences may ensue if regulated entities generate
relevant information).
11. These consequences may be explicit or implicit in the regulatory text. They may result
from the allocation of the burden of proof or the quantum of proof required to support
regulatory action. See infra Part IH.A.3.
12. Section 404 applies to discharges of dredged and fill material into waters of the United
States. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). Some wetlands qualify as waters of the United States. As
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Against the backdrop of the literature on information demand and supply in
chemical regulation, this paper evaluates the impact of information demand and supply
on the success of federal regulation pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. It focuses on
how section 404 and the regulations governing permitting determine information
demands, information supply, and the legal consequences of a gap between supply and
demand. The goal of this inquiry into the demand/supply/consequences scheme is to
determine if, taken as a whole, the scheme is coherent and rational in light of the
policies that underlie section 404.
Because section 404 is a unique blend of pollution control regulation and natural
resource management, the protection of wetlands under section 404 provides an
interesting lens through which to consider the impact of information demands. The
fundamental similarity between a health-protective statute such as section 6 of TSCA 3
and section 404 is that both statutes seek to regulate activities that will introduce
harmful substances into the environment. Moreover, section 404 is part of the CWA, a
statutory framework that adopts primarily a pollution-control approach to achieving its
goals by focusing on avoiding harmful discharges into the environment. 14 Yet
protecting functions and values of wetlands is a goal related to natural resource
conservation, which is generally achieved through resource management legislation.
The most obvious difference between natural resources law and pollution control
law is the emphasis on the affected resources as opposed to polluting activities or
substances. As Professor Fischman and others have pointed out, the distinctions
between pollution control and natural resource management statutes blur at the
margin.15 Almost all environmental problems can be characterized as addressing
resource protection issues, whether the resource is public land, air, or water. And many
problems of natural resource management entail pollution avoidance. As such, even the
names distinguishing these realms ultimately prove unsatisfactory. Yet scholars and
practitioners typically focus on only one of the two realms and remain largely ignorant
is described further infra note 183 and accompanying text, wetlands receive special treatment
under the EPA's 404(b)(1) guidelines as a species of "special aquatic site." Where the
regulations treat discharges into wetlands differently from those into other waters, this paper
focuses on the rules applicable to discharges in jurisdictional wetlands.
13. This section requires the EPA to impose regulatory requirements on the "manufacture,
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture...
that presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.., to
the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk, using the least burdensome
requirements .... 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
14. Section 404 of the CWA is unusual in that its roots lie in the Corps of Engineers's
section 10 program under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, originally implemented to
protect the navigability of the nation's waters by avoiding the introduction of obstructions. The
approach embodied in sectionl0 seems best characterized as akin to a pollution control
approach. It undertook to keep certain types of obstructions out of navigable waters rather than
establishing a process aimed at preserving the resource. The scope of section 10 was later
recognized to also encompass activities outside navigable waters but that have an effect on
navigability. See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1299-300 (5th Cir.
1976); Weiszmann v. Dist. Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 757-58 (2d Cir. 1964).
15. See generally Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resource Law,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005); Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands I: Air
Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 1, 4-6 (1993).
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of what occurs in the other.16 More than inherent differences in the nature of the
problems addressed, the differences between the two realms may reflect differences in
the identified goals for government action and related decisions about how to regulate.
These inhere not in the nature of the resource or even the phenomena that prompt
regulation, but in our legal framework for conceiving of the relevant resource, and our
attitudes and decisions about what constitutes the problem, along with the best way to
approach the problem.
One distinction in defining the problem is that pollution control tends to focus on
human health protection, while natural resource management focuses on protecting a
broader array of environmental values. This is accurate to a point and an important
distinction. Most natural resource management statutes focus on environmental values
primarily, and only secondarily on human health protection. However, even
paradigmatic pollution control statutes such as the Clean Water Act focus on the
integrity of the environment as well as human health. 17 And the Clean Air Act grants
the EPA authority to address air pollution's effects on the environment.'
8
Although not perfect, this distinction is nonetheless important and useful. It helps to
explain why the information regimes under the two types of statutes may differ
significantly. Although some of the same problems that bedevil the use of information
under health protective statutes also impede the use of information under environment-
focused statutes, important differences flow from a focus primarily on human health as
opposed to the environment. Many important problems with the collection and use of
scientific information under health protective statutes are unique artifacts of the
scientific methods for determining the risk of cancer posed by a substance, a concern
measured and assessed using highly specialized methods very different from those
used for predicting depletion of a natural resource like timber or species.19
Another distinction that is helpful to understanding the difference in the two realms
is the ownership of the resource at issue. Professor Fischman has noted that the
dividing line between the realms of natural resources and pollution control law may be
whether authority for regulation arises from the Constitution's Property Clause or the
Commerce Clause. 20 Where the government is treated by the legal system as owning
the resource and thus acts under the Property Clause, the predominant legal framework
employed is a natural resource management approach. 21 This makes sense since the
public interest is at its strongest, and the government is the owner of the resource, not
just the sovereign regulating commerce. Where the resource is affected with the public
trust, as with endangered species and wetlands, Congress has typically adopted a
hybrid natural resource management/ pollution control approach.22 This approach
16. See Fischman, supra note 15, at 194.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2006).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7409(b) (2006).
19. See Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science'" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63, 65-66 (2003).
20. See Fischman, supra note 15, at 193; Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of
Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 1,
21-24 (2008).
21. Fischman, supra note 20, at 22.
22. Id. at 6-7.
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reflects the public trust interest held by the government, a less-extensive federal
property interest. Finally, where the resource is treated as unowned or available for
some or all to claim, as with air or water in which rights have not been allocated, the
government acts under its Commerce Clause authority and a pollution control approach
has predominated. 23 Taken together, these distinctions have considerable explanatory
power. 24
Finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, section 404 represents a fundamentally
different regulatory structure from the rulemaking model employed in many health-
focused statutes. Section 404, like many natural resource management statutes,
employs a permitting scheme in which proposed activities are reviewed according to
regulatory standards and permission is individually granted or denied. 25 In light of
these several important differences-section 404's predominant focus on
environmental quality and not public health, wetlands' status as a public trust resource,
and the reliance on a permitting mechanism rather than rulemaking-it is not
surprising that the analysis of section 404's information regime reveals a
fundamentally different interaction among information demand, supply, and the
consequences that flow from any information gap from that found in the context of
chemical regulation. Unlike chemical regulation, where a combination of unrealistic
demands and inadequate supply produces regulatory paralysis, the picture that emerges
from the wetlands permitting process is quite different and somewhat more complex.
Although different, the information regime under section 404 reveals its own problems.
Provisions that assign the permitting agency considerable discretion over the
information supplied by permit applicants and conflicting provisions that create
ambiguity and grant the agency discretion over the consequences of insufficient proof
in the context of the permitting process add up to a poor design for achieving the
statutory purposes.
Part I provides an overview of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and
identifies to the extent possible the goals section 404 was enacted to advance. Part II
then provides some facts regarding wetlands loss and the section 404 permitting
23. Id. at 21.
24. A counterexample is the ambient air quality standards and state implementation plans
under the Clean Air Act, which arguably represent an instance of natural resource management
planning of an unowned open access resource.
25. This paper focuses solely on the regulatory provisions that guide a determination on
whether to issue an individual permit, as distinct from those that determine whether a permit is
needed, and what mitigation must be performed to offset any adverse impacts. Provisions
related to the scope of jurisdiction under section 404, general permits, exclusions, and
mitigation requirements also create information demands and supply, which are largely
independent from those I examine. For example, the lack of monitoring of mitigation efforts,
lack of data on watershed and cumulative impacts of proposed activities, and the limited
information relied on to issue nationwide general permits all may be occasions where an
inadequate supply of information interferes with achieving the statutory purposes.
The scope of federal jurisdiction is also an issue of controversy, most recently addressed by
the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). This article does not
address the interesting question of information demands created by the tests for jurisdiction,
including those raised by the Rapanos decision. See generally Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404
at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a Policy, 55 ALA. L. REv. 607,622-30 (2004) for
a pre-Rapanos summary of the jurisdictional controversy.
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process, suggesting that there is cause for concern about how well section 404 is
achieving its goals. Part HI looks at the permitting process in more detail, with a
particular focus on the flow of information and analyzes how well the
demand/supply/consequences scheme fits with the goals of section 404.
I. THE REGULATORY DECISION MAKING PROCESS UNDER SECTION 404
A. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Related Provisions
Section 101 of the Clean Water Act sets overarching objectives, goals, and policies
for the entire Act, including section 404, and is frequently cited by courts as they try to
interpret provisions of the Act. This objective of the Act is "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 26 To achieve that
objective, Congress enumerated various goals. Discharges into wetlands tend to
undermine these goals.
27
Against this backdrop, section 301 of the CWA imposes a broad prohibition on all
discharges into navigable waters. 28 Activities authorized pursuant to section 404 are
one of the exceptions to that broad prohibition. Section 404(a) authorizes the Secretary
of the Army to "issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites" including wetlands that fall within the jurisdictional reach of the CWA.29 Under
section 404(a), Congress accords the Secretary of the Army broad discretion to issue
permits for discharges into wetlands, thus softening the apparent protective force of
section 301. Absent a permit, however, discharges of dredged and fill material into
wetlands remain prohibited.
The objectives of section 404 are not defined with precision and are subject to some
debate. 30 To understand the purposes of section 404 requires examining it in the
26. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2006); See also Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the
Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL.
L. 29, 32-33 (2003).
27. The goals are: elimination of the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985
and attaining, wherever possible, water quality adequate for protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and for recreation by 1983. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
28. Section 301(a) provides that, "Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (2006).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). This delegation of authority to the Corps, rather than the
EPA, which administers most of the other pollution control permitting under the CWA, exists
for two reasons. First, the Corps administered the precursor wetlands program under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, which the CWA was intended to expand. Congress was "uniquely
aware of the process" and did not want to create "a burdensome bureaucracy." 118 CONG. REC.
33,699 (1972). Second, the Corps and its backers "did not want the extensive Corps dredge and
fill activities to be regulated by an agency other than the Corps." WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF
WETLANDS REGULAnON, §2:7 (2007). The standards that governed the Corps's issuance of
permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act and that carry over into its regulatory program today
are discussed later in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
30. See generally Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection
Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call
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broader context of the statute. Scholars disagree about whether section 404 applies to
activities in wetlands generally or only to those in traditional waterbodies. Some
scholars contend that Congress always intended to regulate wetlands independent of
the CWA,3' while others argue that the legislative debates clearly illustrate Congress's
commitment to protecting wetlands under the CWA.32 Professor Michael Blumm
argues that the legislative history of section 404 demonstrates that Congress intended
to assert federal jurisdiction broadly over any waters that could be regulated under the
Commerce Clause, including wetlands. 33 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Callaway,34 a federal district court held that "navigable waters" does not mean only
those traditionally deemed navigable, but is expanded under section 404 to the
"maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause." 35 The Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.36 upheld the Corps's
definition of waters of the United States, which included those wetlands with actual or
potential effect on interstate commerce, even if not inundated or frequently flooded by
a navigable water.
37
However, there are those who argue that section 404 protection of wetlands is a
"regulatory program run amuck ' 38 and that the term "navigable waters," as retained
from the Rivers and Harbors Act, 39 should carry its plain meaning. 4° Justice
Kennedy's governing opinion in Rapanos v. United States,4 1 while raising many
questions, adopts a middle ground, reading section 404 as granting jurisdiction over
activities in waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be made
navigable, as well as those with a "significant nexus" to such waters.42
Regardless of how this issue is further clarified, it is clear that for activities within
the Corps's jurisdiction, section 404(b) imposes a limit on the Corps's authority to
issue permits. It provides:
Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such disposal site shall be specified
for each such permit by the Secretary (1) through the application of guidelines
for Reform, 60 COLo. L. REV. 695 (1989); Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Callfor
a National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L.
REV. 873 (1993); Vickie V. Sutton, Wetlands Protection-A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C.
ENvTL. L.J. 179 (1998).
31. See Sutton, supra note 30 at 179, 186.
32. See Kalen, supra note 30, at 897-905.
33. Michael C. Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters Its
Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOL. L.Q. 409, 416 n.25
(1980).
34. 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
35. Id. at 686; Kalen, supra note 30, at 893.
36. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
37. Id. at 134-35.
38. Sheila Deely & Mark Latham, The Federal Wetlands Program: A Regulatory Program
Run Amuck, DAILY ENv'T RaP., Apr. 22, 2003, at B 1.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
40. Sutton, supra note 30, at 190-92 (concluding that because the CWA uses "navigable
waters" as a jurisdictional basis, the statute is an inappropriate grounding for wetlands
regulation).
41. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
42. Id. at 2236.
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developed by the Administrator, in conjunction with the Secretary, which
guidelines shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the
territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section 1343(c) of this
title .. .
This provision clearly constrains the Corps to issue permits pursuant to guidelines
designed to avoid or restrict degradation of a wide array of values and functions
associated with waters including wetlands. This concern for protection of conservation
values resonates with the overall purpose of the Act. These same values are echoed by
section 404(c), which authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to veto a section 404
permit whenever the Administrator determines that the proposed discharge will have
an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery
areas, wildlife, or recreational areas.44
This paper starts, therefore, from the premise that a goal of section 404 is to
preclude unacceptable degradation of the values and functions of all wetlands that fall
within CWA jurisdiction and to ensure consideration of the non-economic values and
services that these wetlands provide, as well as the economic value of discharges of
dredged and fill material for navigation and anchorage.45 As is explored in greater
detail below, how much degradation is "unacceptable" remains an open question under
the statute.46 However, the requirement that the Corps assess the degrading impact of
proposed discharges and only grant permits in conformity with anti-degradation
guidelines would make no sense unless Congress had concluded that some degree of
degradation would be unacceptable.47
Nonetheless, section 404 itself provides very limited guidance as to the precise
standard that should govern the Secretary's decision to issue permits for discharges.
Section 404(b) provides the only real guidance as to the substantive standard to be
applied under the statute.48 It requires the Secretary to specify the disposal sites for
discharges of dredged and fill material "through the application of guidelines" to be
developed by the Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary, "which.. . shall be
based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial seas, the
contiguous zone, and the ocean under section 1343(c) of this title .... Thus, the
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2006).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006). This veto power has been invoked by the EPA in only a
small number of cases. See, e.g., Final Determination Concerning Three Wetland Properties, 53
Fed. Reg. 30,093 (Aug. 10, 1988); Final Determination Concerning the Bayou Aux Carpes Site,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,267 (Nov. 15, 1985); Final Determination Concerning the Jack Maybank Site,
50 Fed. Reg. 20,291 (May 15, 1985); Final Determination Concerning the M.A. Norden Site, 49
Fed. Reg. 29,142 (July 18, 1984); Final Determination Concerning the North Miami Landfill, 46
Fed. Reg. 10,203 (Feb. 2, 1981).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(1)(C) (2006).
46. The EPA's guidelines employ the phrase "unacceptable adverse effects." See infra Part
M.B. l(a)(i).
47. The EPA's regulations are consistent with this interpretation. See id.
48. The only other arguably substantive standard is found in section 404(f), which
enumerates certain exceptions to the prohibition on non-permitted discharges. 33 U.S.C. §
1344(f) (2006).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2006). Section 404(b)(2) also mandates consideration of the
economic impact of any proposed discharge on navigation and anchorage if disposal would
[Vol. 83:537
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ultimate standard that governs permit issuance will be determined by the guidelines,
which in turn will be based on criteria comparable to those set forth in section 1343(c).
In turn, 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c), referenced in section 404(b)(1), directs the EPA to
develop guidelines "for determining the degradation" of the waters of the territorial
seas, the contiguous zone, and the oceans. 50 In full, section 1343(c) provides:
(1) The Administrator shall . . . promulgate guidelines for determining the
degradation of the waters of the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and
the oceans, which shall include:
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or welfare,
including but not limited to plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife,
shorelines, and beaches;
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including the
transfer, concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their
byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes;
changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability;
and species and community population changes;
(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and
economic values;
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of
pollutants;
(E) the effect of the disposal at varying rates, of particular volumes and
concentrations of pollutants;
(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of
pollutants including land-based alternatives; and
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans, such as mineral
exploitation and scientific study.
(2) In any event where insufficient information exists on any proposed
discharge to make a reasonable judgment on any of the guidelines
established pursuant to this subsection no permit shall be issued under
section 1342 of this title.
51
otherwise be precluded under the water quality guidelines. See id. § 1344(b)(2). The section
provides that if application of the criteria prohibits specification of a disposal site, the Secretary
must also specify the disposal site "through the application additionally of the economic impact
of the site on navigation and anchorage." Id. This somewhat awkward phrasing seems to require
that if the Secretary concludes that any given disposal site should be prohibited under the
guidelines, he must then also consider the economic impact on navigation and anchorage of
denying disposal at that particular site. This reinforces the Corps's traditional interest in
protecting navigation.
50. Id. § 1343(c)(1).
51. Id. § 1343(c).
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These section 403(c) criteria 52 take account of the effects of disposal of pollutants
on a wide array of life forms,53 and mandate consideration of various qualities of
disposal, 4 and the effects of disposal of pollutants into the waters on a wide array of
values. These values include human health and welfare; esthetic, recreation, and
economic values; and alternate uses of the ocean, such as mineral exploitation and
scientific study.55 Thus, the reference in section 404(b)(1) to section 403(c) must
reflect congressional concern with degradation of a wide variety of values associated
with water, but it fails to provide a clear standard to govern agency decision making.
The net effect of section 404(b) is therefore to grant the Corps broad discretion to issue
permits and to mandate that the EPA and the Corps develop anti-degradation
guidelines to govern issuance of permits. Congress left more precise articulation of the
standard for permit issuance to the agencies in their development of guidelines.
The structure of section 404 provides the Corps far more discretion than many other
CWA permitting provisions which prohibit activities unless certain standards are
complied with. 56 Thus an important attribute of section 404 is the range of discretion it
leaves to the agencies to develop guidelines, and the discretion implicitly accorded to
the Corps by constraining it only to apply these "guidelines. 57
52. Section 404(b)(1) mandates development of guidelines based upon "criteria comparable
to the criteria" applicable under section 403(c). Id. § 1344(b)(1). However, section 403(c) itself
does not contain anything that can readily be called criteria. See id. § 1343(c). The word
"criteria" denotes a standard of judgment, or a rule or principle for evaluating or testing
something. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 477 (2d ed. 1987).
Section 403(c) provides a list of factors for consideration, but not true "criteria" for decision.
See § 1343(c). It may be that Congress assumed that the guidelines developed under section
403(c) would include something that could fairly be called criteria for decisions. If this reading
is accurate, the text of section 404(b) mandates the development of guidelines based on criteria
comparable to those that Congress expected the EPA would develop in its section 403(c)
guidelines.
53. Id. § 1343(c)(1)(A)-(B).
54. These include the persistence and permanence of any effects, the particular volume, and
concentration of the disposal. Id. § 1343(c)(1)(D).
55. Id. § 1343(c)(1)(A), (C), (G). The criteria also specifically require consideration of
"other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of pollutants including land-
based alternatives .... Id. § 1343(c)(1)(F).
56. See e.g. id. § 1342(a) (authorizing permits "upon condition that such discharge will
meet... all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of
this title ...."). All of the sections contain clear directives of what shall and shall not be
approved, permitted, established, or required, etc. While the provisions allow the Administrator
judgment or discretion, the criteria for such judgment and discretion are relatively clear.
57. The term guidelines suggests a less mandatory and clear set of restrictions as compared
with a term like "requirements" or even the generic term "regulations." Moreover, rather than
mandating "compliance" with guidelines, Congress directed that permits be issued "through
application" of the guidelines, another phrasing that is imbued with discretion. Nonetheless,
courts and the Corps all recognize that these guidelines have the force of law. See Michael J.
Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the Congress or
the Army Corps of Engineers to Blame?, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LMG. 445, 464-65 (1998).
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B. The EPA's and Corps's Regulations
For our inquiry, the three key components of section 404 are (1) its delegation of
authority to the Corps to issue individual permits, 58 (2) its requirement that permits be
issued through application of guidelines, and (3) its direction that the guidelines be
based on criteria comparable to section 403(c) of the CWA. In light of our focus on
information demand, supply, and consequences in the implementation of section 404,
the 404(b) guidelines are critical components of the permitting regime.
The Corps and EPA share authority in a unique arrangement under section 404.
Congress authorized the Corps to issue permits for discharges of dredged and fill
material as an adjunct to the Corps's historic authority to protect navigation under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, but the discharges must be in compliance with
guidelines that EPA and the Corps are charged with developing. The Corps
implements the permitting program, but EPA is charged with helping to develop the
guidelines mandated by section 404(b)(1). 59 The EPA has developed extensive
regulations pursuant to 404(b)(1), commonly referred to as the EPA's water quality or
404(b)(1) guidelines. 6° In addition to these regulations, the Corps of Engineers has
developed regulations to govern the permitting process and to effectuate both its
mission to preserve navigation and to consider a broad array of values affecting the
public interest.
61
For purposes of this Article, the pertinent question is the extent to which the
agencies' regulations create information demands, generate information supply, and
the legal consequences that follow when a gap exists between demand and supply.
This Section describes some of the characteristics of the permitting process and then
provides a brief introduction to the EPA's and Corps's regulations that govern permit
issuance.
1. Characteristics of the Permitting Process
A central attribute of section 404 is its structure as a grant of authority to the Corps
to issue individual permits. 62 This creates a substantially different information dynamic
than does a rulemaking process. First, an agency engaged in a licensing or permitting
procedure must define what constitutes a complete application for the license or
58. Section 404 delegates this authority to the Secretary of the Army which has in turn
delegated the authority to the Corps of Engineers. For simplicity, I will refer to the Corps as the
delegee, rather than the Secretary.
59. The statute requires that the Corps apply EPA's guidelines in issuing permits, and that it
also consider the economic impacts on navigation for any activity that would be prohibited
under the guidelines. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(2) (2006). EPA is also given a veto over selection of
a disposal site. This veto power under section 404(c) is predicated on a finding of "unacceptable
adverse effects on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, . . .wildlife, or
recreational areas." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
60. These regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. Part 230.
61. Mortimer, supra note 57, at 464-65 (1998) (describing the origins of the Corps public
interest review and its inconsistency with the goals of the CWA).
62. States can request and receive delegated authority to issue permits pursuant to section
404. 33 U.S.C. § 404(g)-(h) (2006). This discussion will refer to the Corps as the permitting
authority for simplicity.
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permit. This means that the agency has the opportunity to create a well-defined set of
information demands for permit applicants. Applicants expect to bear the burden of
coming forward with required information. In addition, the agency must establish
relatively clear standards governing permit issuance as an element of due process. 63 If
the required information is provided, applicants can expect that a permit decision will
be made based on the stated criteria.
Another characteristic of an individual permitting process is that it may create
information demands that apply to a large number of individual parties, as is true under
section 404. Thus, information demands are amplified by the number of individual
decisions. The costs of information demands-whether the burden of these demands
falls on applicants or the agency--can become cumulatively significant.
Another feature common to many individual permitting schemes including section
404 is that the decisions are highly localized and numerous. In addition, as with many
discharges subject to permitting under the Clean Water Act, discharges into wetlands
typically have concentrated benefits for the applicant. Adverse effects will often be
diffuse and difficult to detect, and may be individually insignificant but cumulatively
significant. Therefore, the effects of a proposed discharge often will be experienced by
parties who are not aware of the permit proceeding or of its potential effects on their
interests.
The diffuse, localized, and incremental nature of the impacts and the numerous
proceedings mean that relatively few permit proceedings are monitored by any person
or organization whose primary concern is to advocate for the public interest. With the
exception of proposals affecting a very large area or an area of exceptional ecological
significance, applications are unlikely to generate involvement by large public interest
organizations. Neighbors of a proposed activity area, or local or regional
environmental organizations may become involved where they learn of projects with
significant impacts. However, such groups often lack the resources to participate in all
decisions in which they may have an interest. Thus, the vast majority of the
applications that may contribute to cumulatively significant impacts will be
uncontested.
This means that the permitting process will frequently be a one-party proceeding.
Consequently, the Corps's role as the only party likely to ferret out information on
adverse impacts takes on greater significance. However, as the Corps makes clear in its
regulations, it envisions itself in the role of neutral arbiter of the proposal. In its
regulations, the Corps states that "[t]he Corps is neither a proponent nor opponent of
any permit proposal." 64 In other words, the Corps merely evaluates the proposal for
compliance. Although the Corps applies at a minimum a standard that is grounded in
avoiding proposed discharges that are "contrary to the public interest,"65 the Corps is
not the advocate of the public interest. The Corps's neutral role in the proceeding may
significantly affect the information dynamics.
63. The Due Process Clause requires licensing decisions to be based upon established
standards, rather than upon the whim of the licensor. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886); GE Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1454-55 (2d Cir. 1991);
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964).
64. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(4) (2007).
65. Id. § 320.4(a)(1).
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2. The EPA's Section 404(b)(1) Water Quality Guidelines
Within the context of the 404 permitting process described above, the water quality
guidelines play a central role. They contain the most clearly articulated standards,
which the Corps applies to distinguish permissible from impermissible activities. The
guidelines begin in § 230.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations by setting out the
purposes and policies of the water quality guidelines. This provision echoes the
purposes set forth in section 101 of the Clean Water Act, stating that the purpose of the
guidelines is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
waters of the United States through the control of discharges of dredged or fill
material."66
Following this broad introduction, § 230.1 (c) and (d) provide, respectively, what the
guidelines term a "fundamental precept" and a "guiding principle":
(c) Fundamental to these Guidelines is the precept that dredged or fill material
should not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem, unless it can be
demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse
impact either individually or in combination with known and/or probable
impacts of other activities affecting the ecosystems of concern.
(d) From a national perspective, the degradation or destruction of special aquatic
sites, such as filling operations in wetlands, is considered to be among the most
severe environmental impacts covered by these Guidelines. The guiding
principle should be that degradation or destruction of special sites may
represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources.
67
Together, these express something close to a presumption against discharges into
wetlands.
68
The EPA's water quality guidelines do not create specific standards that directly
govern private actors' conduct. Instead, the regulations outline a decision-making
process by which the Corps must determine whether a discharge proposed by an
applicant is in compliance with the guidelines and thus eligible for a permit. Section
230.12(a) outlines the decision options for the Corps under the guidelines. These
options are to specify that the proposed disposal: (1) complies with the guidelines, (2)
complies with the guidelines with inclusion of appropriate and practicable conditions,
or (3) fails to comply with the guidelines. 69 This last option is further defined by a list
of the four circumstances that warrant a finding of noncompliance.7 °
66. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(a) (2007).
67. Id. § 230.1(c)-(d).
68. In fact, another section of the regulations refers to "[tihe presumption against the
discharge in § 230.1" in the course of applying § 230.1 to decisions involving short form
evaluations. Id. § 230.6(c). However, there is some ambiguity surrounding this so-called
presumption. Specifically, the core standards for compliance found in § 230.10 are phrased as
exceptions to the authority to grant a permit. See id. § 230.10. In other words, the presumption
appears to be reversed, prohibiting issuance of a permit only if an affirmative finding is made
under one of section 230.10's proscriptions.
69. Id. § 230.12(a)(l)-(3).
70. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(i)-(iv). These are:
2008]
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
Pursuant to section 404's mandate that permits be issued through application of
guidelines, § 230.10 imposes four conditions on the Corps's authority to grant permits.
These core standards governing permit issuance in turn form the basis for a finding of
compliance or failure of compliance under § 230.12. Section 230.10(a) restricts the
Corps's discretion by requiring that discharges not be permitted "if there is a
practicable alternative . . . which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem.' Subsection (b) requires that permitted discharges not violate various
other laws, including state water quality standards.72 Subsection (c) proscribes
permitting of discharges "which will cause or contribute to significant degradation of
the waters of the United States. 73 Finally, subsection (d) precludes the granting of
permits unless "appropriate and practicable steps have been taken which will minimize
potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem."
74
As phrased, none of these restrictions on the Corps's otherwise broad discretion to
grant permits is effective absent proof that the specified circumstances exist
(practicable alternatives, violation of other law, significant degradation, or failure to
take appropriate steps to minimize adverse impacts). Reading § 230.10 in isolation, it
appears that unless a relevant affirmative finding is made on one of these four
conditions, the Corps retains its authority to issue a permit. 75 However, as is noted
above, § 230.1(c) appears to create an overall presumption against permitting of a
discharge "unless it can be demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an
unacceptable adverse impact either individually or in combination with known and/or
probable impacts of other activities affecting ecosystems of concern. 76
(i) There is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge that would have less
adverse effect on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as such alternative does not have
other significant adverse environmental consequences; or
(ii) The proposed discharge will result in significant degradation of the aquatic
ecosystem under § 230.10(b) or (c); or
(iii) The proposed discharge does not include all appropriate and practicable
measures to minimize potential harm to the aquatic ecosystem; or
(iv) There does not exist sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as
to whether the proposed discharge will comply with these Guidelines.
Three of the findings warranting a denial that are set forth in § 230.12 are based on the water
quality guidelines' core substantive constraints on the Corps's authority to grant permits found
in § 230.10. These are discussed further; see infra Part III.B.la.ii-iv. The fourth finding-
insufficient information-is discussed in detail, in connection with the consequences of an
information shortfall. See infra Part II.B. 1.c.i.
71. Id. § 230.10(a). This is qualified by the requirement that the alternative not have other
significant adverse environmental consequences.
72. Id. § 230.10(b). Because subsection (b) merely incorporates pre-existing legal
obligations, this analysis focuses on the other three subsections.
73. Id. § 230. 10(c).
74. Id. § 230. 10(d).
75. As is discussed further infra, imposing these burdens on the Corps would tend to favor
unregulated discharges. Nonetheless, the impact is not as strong as would be an affirmative
requirement that the Corps grant a permit in the absence of an affirmative finding. Under
section 404, the Corps must make an affirmative decision to grant a permit and authorize
activity in most cases and there is no clear mandate that it issue any permits. See 33 U.S.C. §
1344 (2006).
76. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c). One way to reconcile the two apparently inconsistent provisions
is that section 230.1 and section 230.10 impose two distinct constraints on the Corps's authority
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Further, § 230.12(a)(3)(iv) provides that a proposed discharge must be deemed not
to comply with the guidelines where there is not sufficient information to make a
reasonable judgment as to whether the proposed discharge will comply.77 In a joint
memorandum to Corps staff, the Corps and EPA have reiterated that this is the proper
allocation of the burden of proof, citing that "[t]he burden of proof to demonstrate
compliance with the Guidelines rests with the applicant; where insufficient information
is provided to determine compliance, the Guidelines require that no permit be issued.
40 CFR [sic] 230.12(a)(3)(iv).
78
Thus the guidelines seem to create opposing presumptions or burdens of proof
under § 230.1 and § 230.12 on the one hand, and § 230.10 on the other. Pursuant to §
230.1, the Corps must make an overall affirmative determination that there will be no
"unacceptable adverse effects" before it can issue a permit. Section 230.10, on the
other hand, imposes only specific explicit constraints on the Corps's permit granting
authority. It constrains the Corps's authority to issue a permit only if the Corps makes
one of four affirmative findings under § 230.10. The requirement under § 230.12 that
the Corps make a finding that the proposed activity complies or fails to comply with
"the guidelines" echoes the structure of § 230.10, requiring a finding of failure to
comply only when affirmative findings are made pursuant to the standards of
§ 230.10.79 The tension between the allocation of the burden of proof in these sections
and the presumption against discharges in § 230.1 is not addressed in the guidelines.
Outside of the core substantive provisions of § 230.10, a substantial portion of the
EPA's guidelines are devoted to outlining the various elements of the aquatic
environment that may be affected by a discharge and the characteristics and values that
may be adversely affected by a proposed activity.80 These portions of the guidelines
function as a checklist for regulators rather than as specific regulatory requirements.
to issue permits. Pursuant to section 230.1, the Corps must make an overall affirmative
determination that there will be no unacceptable adverse effects before it can issue a permit. See
33 C.F.R. § 230.1. Section 230.10, on the other hand, imposes certain narrower, specific
prohibitions-that the Corps cannot issue a permit if it makes any of the findings under 230. 10.
See id. § 230.10. One problem is that neither the term "unacceptable adverse effects" in § 230.1
nor the term "significant degradation" in § 230.10(c) is defined. Thus their relationship is
unclear.
77. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv).
78. Memorandum from Robert H. Wayland, 11I, Dir., Office of Wetlands, Oceans, &
Watersheds, U.S. EPA & Michael L. Davis, Assistant Sec'y, Office of the Army (Civil Works),
to the Field, available at http://www.usace.army.miilinet/functions/cw/cecwo/reglmou/
flexible.htm.
79. Section 230.12 also makes insufficiency of information to support a reasonable
judgment a separate ground for denying a permit. 40 C.F.R. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv). This would
seem to suggest that a preliminary determination of the adequacy of the available information
must be made, independent of the assessment of the three substantive standards.
80. See generally id. §§ 230.20-.54 (describing potential effects on substrate, suspended
particulates/turbidity, water, current patterns and water circulation, normal water fluctuations,
salinity gradients, threatened and endangered species, fish, crustaceans, mollusks and other
aquatic organisms in the foodweb, other wildlife, sanctuaries and refuges, wetlands, mud flats,
vegetated shallows, coral reefs, riffle and pool complexes, municipal and private water supplies,
recreational and commercial fisheries, water-related recreation, aesthetics, parks, national and
historical monuments, national seashores, wilderness areas, research sites, and similar
preserves).
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The guidelines list factors to be considered. On the basis of these listed potential
effects, the Corps is directed to make findings on whether a discharge complies with
the requirements of § 230.10, the substantive core of the water quality guidelines.81
3. The Corps of Engineers's Public Interest Regulations
The Corps's regulations implementing section 404 explicitly build on the Corps's
regulatory program under the 1890-era Rivers and Harbors Acts. 82 Although the
Corps's authority focused entirely on protecting navigation under these statutes for
many years, the enactment of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958,83 the
National Environmental Policy Act, 84 and judicial decisions under these statutes
broadened the Corps's mandate to incorporate consideration of a broader array of
conservation values. 85 Even before the enactment of section 404 and the judicial
confirmation of the Corps's authority and mandate to consider conservation values, the
Corps had revised the regulations governing its Rivers and Harbors Act permit
program to require that permit decisions rest on "an evaluation of all relevant factors,
including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and wildlife,
conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public interest. ' ' 86 Thus,
conservation has long been an aspect of the Corps's interpretation of its mandate. The
Corps's section 404 regulations set forth a broad, open-ended balancing test in which
the Corps seeks to account for a wide array of values that affect the public interest.8 7
81. Section 230.11 requires the Corps to determine the short- and long-term effects of each
proposed discharge on the physical, chemical, and biological components of the aquatic
environment. Id. § 230.11. The Corps must determine "the nature and degree of effect that the
proposed discharge will have, individually and cumulatively," on the physical substrate; water
circulation, fluctuation, and salinity; kinds and concentrations of suspended
particulate/turbidity; quantity or location of contaminants; and structure and function of aquatic
ecosystem and organisms. Id. § 230.1 1(a)-(g). This guideline lists various physical indicators of
impact (e.g., changes in substrate elevation, water chemistry, dissolved gas levels) that must be
"considered" in making these determinations but does not impose any standard of care as to any
of these impacts, leaving in place § 230. 10(c)'s standard of "significant degradation."
82. See 33 C.F.R § 320.1(a) (2007).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 662 (2006).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
85. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
86. 33 Fed. Reg. 18,670, 18,671 (Dec. 18, 1968) (setting out text of revised 33 C.F.R. §
209.120(d)). The general concept of "public interest review" appears to have been adopted from
the Corps's impact assessment employed in its planning process for water resources projects.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 62,732, 62,740 (Sept. 19, 1980) (referencing Corps Planning Process Impact
Assessment to illustrate the general public interest balancing process in 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(a)(1)).
87. This non-exclusive list mentions:
conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands,
historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land
use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and
conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production,
mineral needs, considerations of property ownership, and, in general, the needs
and welfare of the people.
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The substantive core of the Corps's public interest review is found in 33 C.F.R. §
320.4, which describes the "policies" that are "applicable" to the review of all
applications for Corps permits.8 8 Consistent with the broad discretion granted the
Corps under section 404 to issue permits, the Corps has constrained itself only to
"apply" these "policies" to the review of applications. Thus the overarching framework
for the Corps's public interest review maintains a "soft" regulatory framework. The
regulations give the Corps broad discretion to decide which factors are relevant and
how heavily they should be weighed. The regulations provide that the decision whether
to issue a permit:
will be based on an evaluation of the probable impacts, including cumulative
impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest.
Evaluation of the probable impact which the proposed activity may have on the
public interest requires a careful weighing of all those factors which become
relevant in each particular case. The benefits which reasonably may be expected to
accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its reasonably foreseeable
detriments.
8 9
Thus, in place of a standard, the regulations dictate a balancing of various factors.
The regulations go on to describe all the factors which may be relevant to this
balancing, including factors that reflect "the national concern for both protection and
utilization of important resources." 9° The Corps must identify relevant effects of the
proposed activity on a wide range of values, some readily quantifiable (food and fiber
production, mineral needs); some not readily susceptible to quantification
(conservation, aesthetics, floodplain values); and some that are extremely broad and
ambiguous (the needs and welfare of the people, land use, economics, wetlands). 91
Based on consideration of this laundry list of values, the Corps undertakes to determine
whether the proposed activity would be contrary to the public interest. 92 Under the
regulations, a permit will be granted unless it would be "contrary to the public
interest." 93 In the case of wetlands deemed to perform functions important to the public
interest, however, the presumption is reversed, and the Corps must determine whether
the benefits of the proposed alteration outweigh the damage to the wetland resource. 94
Permits for discharges into wetlands deemed to perform functions important to the
public interest are only granted if the benefits outweigh the damage to the wetland
resource. 95
Given the wide array of values, the difficulty of quantifying many of the values, and
the challenge of computing the relative impact on the public interest across the many
different values, these regulations amount to a broad grant of discretion. As one
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2007).
88. The Corps also applies the water quality guidelines. The Corps's regulations make clear
that a permit will be denied if the discharge does not comply with the EPA's 404(b)(1)
guidelines. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 320.4(b)(4).
95. Id.
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commentator has described it, the Corps's public-interest review "reads like a parody
of standardless administrative choice." 96 The net result of this lack of a standard is to
preserve the Corps's broad discretion to issue or deny permits and to make a successful
challenge to the Corps's public interest review difficult.
II. WETLANDS Loss IN THE UNITED STATES: CAUSE FOR CONCERN
There is widespread agreement that wetlands serve important values. 97 Wetlands
perform an often-recited list of functions that are clearly valuable to humans. These
include: maintaining fish and wildlife habitat; providing essential breeding and nursery
areas for many species including economically important shellfish; protecting water
supply through recharge; protecting water quality through purification; providing flood
control; protecting shorelines from erosion by binding stream banks and absorbing
wave energy; establishing outdoor recreation opportunities for hunters and bird and
wildlife watchers; and providing education and research benefits. 98 In addition, the loss
or degradation of wetlands often produces degradation of other waters.
99
There is ample basis for concern over whether the section 404 program is operating
effectively as the primary federal regulatory check on degradation of wetlands. ' Each
administration since President George H.W. Bush has embraced a policy of preventing
net loss of wetlands. 101 To the extent that we are still losing wetlands, it is appropriate
96. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.12, at 205
(1986); see also Ellen K. Lawson, The Corps of Engineers' Public Interest Review Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Broad Discretion Leaves Wetlands Vulnerable to
Unnecessary Destruction, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203, 227 (1988); Mortimer,
supra note 57, at 446.
97. See Floumoy, supra note 25 at 636-37.
98. See MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCIENCE, LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 55-63 (1993); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE WETLANDS STRATEGIES: A
GUIDE TO PROTECTING AND MANAGING THE RESOURCE 4-6 (1992); A Presidential Wetlands
Debate, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash., D.C.), May-June 1992, at 5
(quoting presidential candidate George H.W. Bush in 1992 describing some of these important
functions of wetlands).
99. See EARTHJUSTICE, NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL & SIERRA
CLUB, RECKLESS ABANDON: How THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS EXPOSING AMERICA'S WATERS
TO HARM (2004), available at http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/RecklessAbandon.pdf; NAT'L
WILDLIFE FED'N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WETLANDS AT RISK-IMPERILED TREASURES 2
(2002), http://www.nrdc.org/water/conservation/atrisk/wetlands.pdf
100. Section 404 is not the only check on wetlands loss. Non-regulatory federal subsidy
programs and state regulatory programs designed to limit conversion of wetlands to farmland or
to purchase wetlands also exist; however, much degrading activity falls outside these programs'
scope.
101. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003) (soliciting
suggestions from the public on how to change the definition of "waters" so that more areas are
protected under section 404); Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in
Wetlands Protection, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204 (1994); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON
ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE
APPROACH (1993), available at http://www.wetlands.comlfed/aug93wet.htm [hereinafter A
FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH]. The no net loss policy explicitly envisions loss of
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to inquire whether section 404 is achieving its intended purposes. Thus, the pace of
wetlands destruction in the United States provides one piece of evidence regarding the
impact of section 404.
Despite progress in the regulatory protection of wetlands, the pace of wetlands loss
remains significant, the losses steady even if incremental. 102 However, the most recent
study by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service shows that mitigation efforts are more than
offsetting the acreage lost each year. 103 Thus, we appear to be meeting the national
policy of no "net" loss of wetlands. However, this same report cautions that much of
the acreage lost was vegetated freshwater wetlands, a type of wetlands that possess a
wide range of values and functions.'04 In contrast, much of the gain reported came
from freshwater pond acreage. 105 While ponds are valuable, the report notes that open
water ponds "would not be expected to provide the same range of wetland values and
functions as a vegetated freshwater wetland."'06
The facts and figures on wetlands loss tell a story of rapid destruction in the middle
of the twentieth century, slowed by enactment of both section 404 and incentive
programs during the latter part of the century.'07 The pace of loss varies across the
wetlands, but only when the losses are offset by gains of wetlands through creation. Id. Under
current policies, a commitment to preserve or restore existing wetlands may be counted as
"gains" that offset losses of wetlands. Id.
102. See THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS
IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1986 TO 1997, 30-34 (2000), http://training.fws.gov/
library/Pubs9/wetlands86-97_lowres.pdf [hereinafter 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS].
103. THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN
THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004, 15 (2006),
http://wetlandsfws.er.usgs.gov/status-trends/national-reports/trends-2005-report.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 STATUS AND TRENDS] (concluding that there has been an average annual net
gain of 32,000 acres per year during the period from 1998-2004); see NATURAL RES.
CONSERVATION SERv., NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY 2002 ANNUAL NRI (2004),
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technicalland/nriO2/wetlands.pdf (finding that an average annual
nationwide loss of 10,000 wetlands acres was offset by an average annual gain of 36,000 acres
between 1997 and 2002).
104. 2004 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 103.
105. Id. at 76. The report describes that among the created open water ponds are freshwater
fishing ponds, artificial water detention, retention and water hazard ponds, ponds for
aquaculture, and ponds used solely for ornamentation, which "are not an equivalent replacement
for vegetated wetlands." Id.
106. Id. at 94. The report specifically notes the ongoing net loss of freshwater emergent
marshes, 142,570 acres of which were lost over this period. Id. at 17. The report notes the
importance of these wetlands to fish and wildlife. Id.
107. See 2000 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 102. Dahli calculates the average rate of loss
over the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s at 458,000 acres per year. Id. at 34.
Between 1970 and 1980, the average annual net wetland loss for the conterminous United States
was 290,000 acres of wetlands each year. Id. Between 1986 and 1997, the net loss of wetlands
in the conterminous United States appeared to slow dramatically. The total wetland loss for the
decade amounted to only 644,000 acres, or an average of 58,500 acres of wetlands per year. Id.
at 9, 34. But see Ralph Heimlich & Jeanne Melanson, Wetlands Lost, Wetlands Gained, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash., D.C.), May-June 1995, at 1 (providing a
contrasting assessment by the Natural Resource Conservation Service for the overlapping period
of 1982 through 1992 that suggested a rate of loss of 70,000 to 90,000 acres a year on non-
federal lands).
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country, with some states continuing to lose wetlands at an extremely rapid pace. 108
The impacts of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 reminded the public of the ongoing
losses of wetlands that are being permitted under existing law and the consequences
for human health, safety, and welfare of those losses. 109
Of course, acreage loss cannot tell the whole story," 10 but we frequently rely on
acreage because we lack more detailed information about the values and functions
lost. "'1 Typically it is only when disaster strikes in the form of a flood or pollution of a
water body that we assess with hindsight the loss of particular values and functions
associated with specific wetlands. " 2 In part, our failure to focus on the loss of services
and values may be attributable to the fact that the loss is incremental. Each individual
patch of wetlands lost to development may not cause measurable impact to the values
or services we depend on, but over time, the cumulative impact of lost services and
values within a watershed can be substantial. "3
108. See 2004 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 103, at 53.
109. See Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 56-57 (2006).
Wetlands along the Louisiana coast are also being lost due to natural processes, but the impacts
of permitted activities related to shipping and oil and gas development play a significant role.
Id. Moreover, the natural processes of erosion were historically tempered by natural processes
of accretion that human alteration of the Mississippi River system has now obstructed. Id.
110. See R. Eugene Turner, Ann M. Redmond & Joy B. Zedler, Count It by Acre or
Function-Mitigation Adds Up to Net Loss of Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law
Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 14-15. In addition to the inherent limitations of acreage
as a measure of lost values, assessments of the acreage lost may not be reliable. For example,
they may incorporate optimistic assumptions about the long-term success of efforts to mitigate
losses through creation of new wetlands. Id. at 14. A study by the National Research Council's
Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses found that although the Corps intends to require 178
hectares of mitigation for every 100 hectares of wetlands destroyed, a permit requiring 178
hectares of mitigation results on the ground in only 16-19 acres of restored wetland function. Id.
at 14-15. Even the National Wetlands Inventory, which employs aerial photos to assess
wetlands acreage, sometimes counts created wetlands that may not survive over time. See U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Wetlands Inventory, http://www.fws.gov/nwi/. For reports
documenting the shortfall in efforts to create wetlands, see Ann M. Redmond, Florida Moves to
Mitigation Banking, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash., D.C.) Nov.-Dec. 1995,
at 14; N.J. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., Div. OF SCI., RESEARCH & TECH., CREATING INDICATORS OF
WETLAND STATUS (QUANTITY AND QUALITY): FRESHWATER WETLAND MITIGATION IN NEW
JERSEY (2002), http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dsr/wetlands/.
111. See 2004 STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 103, at 89. This report expressly disclaims
any effort to evaluate quality or functioning of wetlands. Id. However, it highlights recent state
efforts in this regard, including Minnesota's ongoing commitment to monitor wetland quality
and to prevent net loss of quantity, quality, and biological diversity. Id. at 89-91.
112. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina provides an example of the broader public
recognition that these lost values receive in hindsight. See, e.g., Ecological Soc'y of Am.,
Ecological Effects of Gulf Coast Hurricanes, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.yubanet.com/artman/
publish/article_40172.shtml.
113. In Collier County Florida, the St. Petersburg Times reported that $30 million of public
money was being used to buy neighborhoods that flooded because of wetlands development.
See Craig Pittman & Matthew Waite, They Won't Say No, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 22,
2005, at IA, available at LEXIS 102BGI.
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Another measure of the efficacy of the section 404 program is the rate at which
permits are granted. While this is a crude and imperfect measure, the numbers in some
Corps districts are startling. An investigation by the St. Petersburg Times revealed that
in Florida, in 2003, out of 3,400 permit applications, 3,400 were approved and none
were denied. 1 4 Between 1999 and 2003, 12,000 were approved and one was denied." 5
Upon first reading these numbers, one might understandably conclude that review
under section 404 had no impact on the degradation of wetlands-that no matter how
extensive the activity proposed and the attendant degradation, the Corps would
approve it. However, this reading of the figures on permit approvals is not a fair one.
First, Florida apparently approves more permits than any other state and allows a
higher percentage of filling of wetlands than the national average. " 6 Second, some
proposed activities undoubtedly do not cause unacceptable degradation and therefore
should be permitted. Third, the very existence of section 404 may cause proponents to
modify their proposals to avoid unacceptable degradation.' 7 Fourth, as the Corps is
quick to point out, the application process is not a one-step process. It often involves
an ongoing discussion or negotiation between the applicant and the Corps during
which the applicant may amend the proposal in response to Corps staff guidance on
what changes are necessary to avoid unacceptable degradation." 8 In other words, a
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. The Corps is reported to say that nationally, 20% of wetlands are saved from
destruction by Corps regulation, whereas in Florida during this period, only 6% of the acreage
was preserved. Id. Furthermore, the Corps's national regulatory statistics for fiscal year 2002
report that of 11,437 individual applications received, 7409 were granted and 128 were denied.
See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, FY 2002 Regulatory Statistics,
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/ functions/ew/cecwo/reg/execsem02.pdf. The Corps also reports
that 4143 were withdrawn, but this number includes individual applications that were
withdrawn because the applicant was approved pursuant to a general permit or were treated as
withdrawn because the applicant never submitted the required information. Id.
117. In other words, section 404 may have a deterrent effect on those who would discharge
material into wetlands, leading them to propose more modest and less degrading activities than
they would have in the absence of section 404. See Flournoy, supra note 25, at 645 (suggesting
that the costs associated with obtaining a section 404 permit may serve as an economic deterrent
to wetland destruction).
118. Thus, an applicant who submits an application for a permit may learn from Corps staff
that the proposal will be denied in its present form, but might be approved if the applicant
reduces the acreage to be filled, avoids certain high quality wetlands, or increases the mitigation
to be provided; however, the applicant may then withdraw the proposal altogether or revise it to
conform to the guidance provided by the Corps staff. See Michael L. Davis, A More Effective
and Flexible Section 404, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash., D.C.), July-Aug.
1995, at 8; Pittman & Waite, supra note 113, at 1A (citing comments by John Hall, former head
of Florida's Corps of Engineers permit program); see also 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(b) (2007)
(describing pre-application consultation for major applications); U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
Regulatory Guidance Letters, http://www.usace.army.millinet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/
rglsindx.htm (letters written by the Corps to its field offices that interpret current regulations
and explain how the regulations apply to permit applications); U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, The
Permit Process: Processing Steps, https://epermit.usace.army.mil/process.html#processing
(describing the pre-application consultation process).
2008]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
denial may not be the only tool available to the Corps for avoiding unacceptable
degradation and achieving the goals of section 404.
A problem with assessing the significance of these facts is that the Corps has not
collected data that would enable one to determine how many acres are protected from
degradation without a permit denial. Without such information, one is left to speculate
about the impact of section 404. One plausible conclusion to draw from the extremely
high rate of permit approvals is that the presence of wetlands and the existence of
section 404 are rarely, if ever, an obstacle to accomplishing what a landowner wishes
to do, and that if some degradation is necessary to allow the landowner to accomplish
his or her purpose, that degradation will be permitted and considered acceptable
degradation. Given that disposal of fill will usually degrade wetlands and interfere with
important wetland values and functions to some extent,' 19 this impression does not
create a high degree of confidence that we are meeting the goal of avoiding
unacceptable cumulative degradation. When this conclusion is paired with the long-
term trend of wetlands acreage loss and replacement of vegetated wetlands by open
ponds, concern for the long-term efficacy of section 404 in preserving the values and
functions of wetlands seems justified. Based on this concern, we now turn to examine
whether information gaps are a significant part of the problem.
1HI. INFORMATION DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND CONSEQUENCES UNDER SECrION 404
Part I provided an overview of section 404 and the key provisions of the EPA and
Corps's regulations that govern individual permitting decisions. Part H sets forth facts
suggesting cause for concern about section 404's efficacy in achieving its goals. This
Part turns to examine the information flow specifically: what information demands the
law creates, the supply of information generated by the law, and the consequences for
permitting decisions if information demands are not met. Part LI.A provides a
taxonomy of demand, supply, and consequence provisions. Part III.B then provides a
detailed analysis of the section 404 regulations and identifies in turn the key provisions
that demand information, generate information supply, and dictate the consequences of
an information shortfall. Part C steps back to identify the key features of the
information scheme under section 404 based on the detailed section-by-section
analysis under Part II.B. 120
A. Demand, Supply, and Consequences
To begin, it may be useful to further define how I employ the terms demand,
supply, and consequences in discussing information flow. A provision affects demand
if it requires the agency to have information, or otherwise base its decision or action on
119. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (2007) ("The degradation or destruction of special aquatic
sites, such as filling operations in wetlands, is considered to be among the most severe
environmental impacts covered by these Guidelines. The guiding principle should be that
degradation or destruction of special sites may represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic
resources.").
120. Some readers may prefer to skip the painstaking and arguably tedious section-by-
section analysis in Part Il.B, proceed directly to Part m.C, and refer back to Part I.B for more
detail on particular provisions of interest.
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certain information. A provision affects supply if it imposes a mandate on some
participant to submit, generate, or otherwise collect information for the agency's use.
The ultimate regulatory effect of supply and demand provisions is determined by a
third type of provision I call consequences provisions. These provisions either
explicitly or implicitly specify the legal consequences that flow from a data gap. That
is, when information supply is inadequate to support a decision under a regulatory
standard or to meet a regulatory burden of proof, a consequences provision determines
the regulatory consequences.
1. Demand Provisions
"Demand" provisions may take a variety of different forms. These provisions may
require the agency to:
* meet a threshold or standard or make a finding as a precondition to a
particular decision or action or to fulfill a direct mandate;
* articulate a basis for or create a record for a decision; or
* consider, weigh, or balance various factors, criteria, or effects before
making a decision.
Some provisions that create demand are what I will call "pure" demand provisions.
By that, I mean that the statute or regulation simply sets forth a demand that the agency
have certain information, without specifying any direct regulatory consequences from
possession of the relevant information. Requirements that the agency "make findings"
on a particular topic, "determine" certain facts, or "consider" certain information are
examples of such "pure" demand provisions. 1
21
Other provisions creating demand may have a more direct connection to a
regulatory decision. These provisions create demand and also help define what
information is required to support a particular agency decision. For example, a
provision may make a particular finding a prerequisite to regulatory action or
otherwise assign regulatory consequences to a finding. I call such a provision a factual
prerequisite, meaning that it defines findings that have regulatory significance under
the statute. 122 For example, the EPA's guidelines direct that the Corps not issue a
permit if it will cause or contribute to significant degradation.' 23 A finding of
degradation is the factual prerequisite that triggers the regulatory prohibition.
In addition, demand is sometimes created by a component of a statute that I will call
the standard of care. I use the term standard of care, drawn from tort law, to refer to a
regulatory standard that dictates the degree of protection or care mandated by the
regulation. In other words, the standard of care determines the boundary between what
121. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(a) (2007) (directing the Corps to determine the effects of a
proposed discharge); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2007) (requiring the Corps to balance favorable
impacts against detrimental impacts when regulating water activities).
122. This analysis employs some of the same terminology applied to the regulatory process
in Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective
Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 327, 346-353 (1991) (discussing
factual prerequisites, standards of care, and standards of proof).
123. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2007).
20081
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
is acceptable and unacceptable conduct under the statute. This may clarify how much
or what kind of information is demanded. For example, in the EPA's guidelines for
specification of disposal sites for dredged or fill material, degradation is the factual
prerequisite to regulation and the modifier "significant" embodies the standard of
care.' 24 The standard of care affects the demand because it provides some clarification
on the question of how much and what kind of evidence of degradation is required
before a permit denial is warranted.
In addition to the factual prerequisite and the standard of care, the standard of proof
also affects the demand for information. The standard of proof defines how much
information the agency must have in order to make a particular finding or decision.
The standard of proof may be implicit rather than explicit. For example, 40 C.F.R. §
230.10(c) requires that the agency not permit a discharge if it "will cause or contribute
to" significant degradation. The phrase "will cause or contribute to" determines that
the agency must have a high degree of certainty that the discharge will cause or
contribute to degradation, operating much the way a standard of proof does in common
law adjudication. In contrast, regulations requiring that the agency not permit a
discharge if it "may cause or contribute to" significant degradation would impose a
lower standard of proof. The higher the standard of proof, the more certainty is
demanded, which can translate into a greater quantum of information demanded.
2. Supply Provisions
Provisions that affect information supply include provisions that require a
participant (including the agency) to:
* file or submit information;
* generate, create, or develop information; or
* seek or acquire information from outside sources. 125
Some provisions are "pure" supply provisions: their sole regulatory force is to
generate information. For example, a provision in the EPA's guidelines directs that the
permitting authority "shall collect information and solicit information from other
sources about the cumulative impacts on the aquatic ecosystem."' 126 This is a pure
supply provision, directing the Corps to collect and seek out information on a certain
topic from outside sources, independent of other provisions that establish the
regulatory significance of the information. 127 Similarly, the provision that details the
124. Id.
125. I have not included in this category weaker provisions that indirectly may affect supply
simply by creating an opportunity for parties to supply information on a particular topic. For
example, see 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(3) (2007), which requires district engineers to provide
applicants the opportunity to offer views on any comments received in the public comment
period if the particular engineer determines he must have them.
126. 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g)(2) (2007).
127. See id. It is not a particularly clear or rigorous supply provision in that it does not
specify any particular minimum information that must be collected, but it nonetheless tends to
increase information supply.
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required content of an application for an individual permit generates a supply of
information.'28
Beyond these pure supply provisions, the allocation of the burden of going forward
and the burden of persuasion on relevant facts may also affect the supply of
information. These burdens of proof are relevant to information supply because how
the burden of proof is allocated affects the incentives for the provision of
information. 129 A party who bears the burden of going forward or the burden of
persuasion on a given question typically has an incentive to provide information on
that question. 130
3. Consequences Provisions
"Consequences" provisions address the question of the legal significance of a
failure of supply to meet demand. In some cases, the consequences are explicit, and the
law specifies the required outcome in the event of a data gap. These can be called
"pure" consequences provisions. For example, the EPA's guidelines explicitly provide
that a proposed disposal site shall be specified as failing to comply with the guidelines
where "[t]here does not exist sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as
to whether the proposed discharge will comply with these Guidelines."
131
This provision explicitly dictates a regulatory outcome in the event of insufficient
information. The threshold set by the consequences provision may not be a purely
objective one. Here, in order to determine whether there is "sufficient information to
make a reasonable judgment" on compliance with the guidelines, the agency must
make both empirical and normative determinations. It must determine what
information there is on compliance and whether it is "sufficient" to make a
"reasonable" judgment, both highly normative determinations.
The allocation of the burden of proof may also operate as a consequences provision.
The allocation of the burden of proof determines the consequences that flow from
inadequate information by assigning a decisional outcome. 132 Like the allocation of the
burden of proof, a presumption also determines the consequences of inadequate
information, by dictating in whose favor a finding will be made in the absence of any
information on a given fact. 133
128. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d) (2007).
129. Wagner, supra note 2, at 1682.
130. The allocation of the burden of persuasion also may determine the consequences of an
information gap, because it may determine how uncertainty will affect the outcome under the
statute. See infra Part II.A.3.
131. 40 C.F.R. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv) (2007).
132. So, for example, the Corps's public interest regulations provide that "a permit will be
granted unless the district engineer determines that it would be contrary to the public interest."
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2007). Under this rule, the agency or any opponent of the discharge is
implicitly allocated the burden of proving that the permit would be contrary to the public
interest. In the absence of sufficient information on adverse impacts on the public interest, the
permit will be granted. This results by virtue of the allocation of the burden.
133. For example, the presumption in the EPA's water quality guidelines that non-wetland
alternatives exist for any proposed activity that is not water-dependent dictates that if there is
insufficient evidence to clearly demonstrate the absence of other alternatives, the Corps must
find that practicable alternatives to the disposal exist and hence, the discharge will not be
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Related to the burden of proof is the standard of proof-the quantum of information
required to support a finding. The standard of proof also helps to determine the
consequences of inadequate information, by specifying how much information is
necessary before the agency can or must reach a specific regulatory outcome. The
standard of care selected can affect the consequences of an information shortfall as
well. For example, the standard in 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) authorizes the Corps to deny
a permit if it finds that the proposed discharge will cause "significant" degradation. It
is possible that the evidence of degradation relevant to a particular application may fail
to satisfy the standard of "significance" largely because of the absence of information.
Thus, the standard of care may indirectly shape the consequences of an information
shortage.
Employing these terms, Part III.B undertakes to review the EPA's water quality
guidelines and the Corps's public interest regulations, identifying which provisions
affect supply or demand or which dictate consequences of an information gap. Part
III.C then analyzes whether these information-related provisions are well designed to
achieve the statutory purpose of section 404.
B. A Detailed Analysis of Provisions Affecting Demand, Supply, and Consequences
1. The EPA Water Quality Guidelines
a. Demand Provisions
The EPA's water quality guidelines create extensive demands for information
through a blend of pure demand provisions, factual prerequisites with regulatory
significance, and standards of care. The core of the EPA's water quality guidelines-
the factual prerequisites and standards of care found in 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1,230.10-
also create the core of the guidelines' demand for information.
i. Section 230.1
Section 230.1 provides:
Fundamental to these Guidelines is the precept that dredged or fill material should
not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem, unless it can be demonstrated that
such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact either individually
or in combination with known and/or probable impacts of other activities affecting
the ecosystems of concern. 134
The prerequisite to a determination that a permit should be granted is a finding of
no unacceptable adverse impact after having considered individual and cumulative
impacts. 35 Thus, regulatory action to grant or deny a permit is conditioned on a
finding regarding the existence of adverse impacts. This creates a broad and general
demand for information on adverse impacts, including information on cumulative
impacts. The standard of care set forth in § 230.1-that permits be issued only if
permitted. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(l)-(3) (2007).
134. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c) (2007).
135. Id.
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impacts are shown not to be "unacceptable"-does not clarify the nature or extent of
the demand significantly. It requires the Corps to make an almost entirely normative
judgment about the evidence, rather than to define the kind or volume of information
demanded. 1
36
ii. Section 230.10(a)
The four core standards in § 230.10(a)-(d) also create demands for information. The
first of these, § 230.10(a), provides "[e]xcept as provided under § 404(b)(2), no
discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable
alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse
environmental consequences."' 
37
In order to fulfill its duty to evaluate permits appropriately, the Corps must have
available information on practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge and the
impact of these alternatives. 138 The factual prerequisite that triggers the prohibition in
§ 230.10(a) is a finding that a practicable alternative with less adverse impacts
exists. 139 This creates a demand for information on alternatives to the proposed
discharge with less adverse impacts. What alternatives will be deemed practicable is
further defined in the regulations, narrowing the class of information on alternatives
that must be considered. 140 The modifier "practicable" is a normative standard. The
regulations define practicable as "available and capable of being done after taking into
consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project
purposes,"141 but even this guidance leaves the Corps a significant role in defining the
class of alternatives that must be considered.
The scope of the required alternatives analysis has been extensively studied, and
there are differing views on how extensive the demand created by this provision is. In a
1989 study of the Corps's implementation of this provision, Professor Oliver Houck
136. The term "unacceptable adverse effects" is defined elsewhere, specifically in the
context of the EPA's section 404(c) veto power. For purposes of the EPA's section 404(c) veto,
"unacceptable adverse effects" is defined in the guidelines as "[i]mpact on an aquatic or wetland
ecosystem which is likely to result in significant degradation of municipal water supplies
(including surface or ground water) or significant loss of or damage to fisheries, shellfishing, or
wildlife habitat or recreation areas." 40 C.F.R. § 231.2(e) (2007). It is not clear whether the use
of the same phrase "unacceptable adverse effects" in both section 404(c) and in the presumption
expressed in § 230.1 against discharges that will cause unacceptable adverse effects means that
the narrow definition of unacceptable adverse effects in § 231.2(e), which mirrors section
404(c), should be applied to § 230.1. If so, the presumption would potentially only apply to
those cases in which the EPA could exercise its veto power. If, however, the presumption in §
230.1 is as broad as it appears on its face and applies generally to all proposed discharges, then
the narrow definition supplied in the context of section 404(c) should not apply. No other
definition of "unacceptable adverse effects" appears elsewhere in the guidelines.
137. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2007).
138. The effect of the presumptions found in 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) is discussed further
infra Part III.B. I (c)(ii).
139. Id.
140. For a delineation of these alternatives, see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(l)-(2) (2007).
141. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(q) (2007).
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documented how the Corps's practice of allowing the proponent of the activity to
define the activity made the demand for evidence of practicable alternatives illusory. 42
By narrowly defining the activity, an applicant could ensure that no practicable
alternative existed, and thus no information was required. In contrast, a recent article
describes the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative requirement as the
steepest hurdle in obtaining a section 404 permit. 143 Nonetheless, some of the
examples cited in the latter article confirm that, at least in some cases, the applicant
can exert dispositive influence over the definition of the project, and thus can limit the
demand for information on alternatives. 44 On the other hand, Professor Houck also
cites cases where the Corps or a reviewing court rejected an applicant's overly narrow
project definition. 145 Thus, the reality seems to be that the demand for information on
alternatives has some force and effect. However, the demand is made more elastic and
less rigorous by the interpretive range accorded the term "practicable" and because, in
some cases, it can be sidestepped entirely by applicants through narrow project
definition. Thus, the demand that must be met to trigger the regulatory prohibition may
obstruct conservation of wetlands because it hinges on information that the applicant
can, by design, make impossible to obtain.
iii. Section 230.10(b)
A relatively limited demand for data is created by § 230.10(b), which requires that
the Corps not grant permits if the activity would violate other specified laws. This
requirement necessitates that the Corps determine compliance with state water quality
standards, toxic pollution standards, and fish and wildlife protective laws. Although
this standard does necessitate information, it is not the sort of information demand that
seriously impedes protective regulation. The Corps requests the data on compliance
from the relevant agencies enforcing these other mandates and can rely on this data and
its sister agencies' evaluation of compliance under the statutes that they administer.
iv. Sections 230.10(c) & 230.11
According to § 230.10(c):
no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted which will cause or
contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States. Findings of
significant degradation related to the proposed discharge shall be based upon
appropriate factual determinations, evaluations, and tests required by Subparts B
142. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis ofAlternatives Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 773, 778-79 (1989).
143. Jon Shutz, The Steepest Hurdle in Obtaining a Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit.
Complying with EPA 's 404(b)(1) Guidelines' Least Environmentally Damaging Practicable
Alternative Requirement, 24 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 235 (2006).
144. Id. at 242-46.
145. Houck, supra note 142, at 812-13.
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and G, after consideration of Subparts C-F, with special emphasis on the
persistence and permanence of the effects outlined in those subparts.' 46
This provision's effect is to make information on whether the discharge will cause
or contribute to the degradation of U.S. waters a factual prerequisite to the
prohibition's operation. The threshold that triggers the regulatory prohibition is a
finding that the degradation is significant. Section 230.10(c) goes on to provide an
inclusive list of the types of effects that contribute to significant degradation, either
individually or collectively. 147 This list is illustrative, providing more detail on the
types of information that may be relevant, rather than limiting the information
demanded. 148 The scope of the information demanded under § 230.10(c) is extremely
broad.
The core demand created by § 230.10(c) for evidence of significant degradation is
amplified through the extensive pure demand provisions in the guidelines that
elaborate on the general data demands set forth in § 230.10. Among the pure demand
provisions are Subpart B (40 C.F.R. § 230.11), which directs the permitting agency to
make extensive factual determinations that are relevant to the ultimate determination of
compliance with the guidelines, and Subpart G (40 C.F.R. § § 230.60-.6 1), which sets
forth testing procedures on which the factual determinations are to be based. These
subparts do not have independent regulatory force, but they create a demand for
specific information by detailing the types of effects the Corps must document and the
testing to be performed. 149 Specifically, § 230.11 requires the Corps to "determine in
writing the potential short-term or long-term effects of a proposed discharge of
dredged or fill material on the physical, chemical, and biological components of the
aquatic ecosystem in light of Subparts C-F."150
Subparts C-F increase the specificity of this very broad pure demand by describing
the physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of the aquatic ecosystem and the
possible loss of environmental characteristics and values that can result from a
146. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2007).
147. Id. § 230.10(c)(1)-(4).
148. The list at 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c)(l)-(4) provides:
Under these Guidelines, effects contributing to significant degradation considered
individually or collectively, include:
(1) Significantly adverse effects of the discharge of pollutants on human health
or welfare, including but not limited to effects on municipal water supplies,
plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and special aquatic sites. [sic]
(2) Significantly adverse effects of the discharge of pollutants on life stages of
aquatic life and other wildlife dependent on aquatic ecosystems, including the
transfer, concentration, and spread of pollutants or their byproducts outside of
the disposal site through biological, physical, and chemical processes;
(3) Significantly adverse effects of the discharge of pollutants on aquatic
ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability. Such effects may include, but
are not limited to, loss of fish and wildlife habitat or loss of the capacity of a
wetland to assimilate nutrients, purify water, or reduce wave energy; or
(4) Significantly adverse effects of discharge of pollutants on recreational,
aesthetic, and economic values.
149. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.11, 230.60-.61 (2007).
150. Id. § 230.11.
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discharge. 151 The nature of the findings to be made are further elaborated in § 230.11,
which requires the Corps to "determine the nature and degree of effect that the
proposed discharge will have, individually and cumulatively," on certain components:
physical substrate; water circulation, fluctuation, and salinity; kinds and concentrations
of suspended particulate/turbidity; quantity or location of contaminants; and structure
and function of aquatic ecosystem and organisms.' 52 Section 230.11 repeatedly
identifies factors that must be "considered" or to which "consideration shall be
given." 153
v. Section 230.10(d)
Section 230.10(d) prohibits the permitting of discharges unless "appropriate and
practicable steps have been taken which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the
discharge on the aquatic ecosystem."'' 54 Rather than imposing a standard for
permissible impacts, this condition assumes the acceptability of the proposed activity
and then assesses whether it can be accomplished with less impact. Impact
minimization is therefore the last step in the decision-making process. 155 Rather than
an effects-based evaluation of the proposed activity, it operates more like a best
technology standard for how to accomplish the proposed activity. Subpart H of the
guidelines lists a variety of techniques that can be used to minimize the potential56
adverse effects of a discharge. As such, these provisions can be viewed as creating
an additional demand for information about relevant minimization measures that are
"appropriate and practicable." However, because the regulations provide detailed
examples of the appropriate technology for different types of adverse impacts, the
demand for information is quite limited. Therefore, § 230.10(d) operates more as a set
151. The characteristics of the ecosystem described in Subparts C and D are: substrate;
suspended particulates/turbidity; water; current patterns and water circulation; normal water
fluctuations; salinity gradients; threatened and endangered species; fish, crustaceans, mollusks,
and other aquatic organisms in the food web; and other wildlife. Id. §§ 230.20-.32. Subpart E
details the areas that qualify as special aquatic sites and the possible associated loss of values
peculiar to these sites. The special aquatic sites described are: sanctuaries and refuges, wetlands,
mud flats, vegetated shallows, coral reefs, and riffle and pool complexes. Id. §§ 230.40-.45.
Subpart F catalogues certain human use characteristics that may be affected-municipal and
private water supplies; recreational and commercial fisheries; water-related recreation;
aesthetics; parks, national and historical monuments, national seashores, wilderness areas,
research sites, and similar preserves-and the possible losses of values that discharges may
cause to these human uses. Id. §§ 230.50-.54.
152. Id. § 230.11(a)-(g).
153. See id. § 230.1 l(a)-(h) (all requiring consideration of various effects or factors).
154. Id. § 230.10(d).
155. Id. § 230.50). The EPA-Corps interagency memorandum on sequencing conforms to
this approach, requiring the Corps to consider avoidance of degradation first, then minimization,
and finally, only as a third step, mitigation. Memorandum of Agreement Between The
Department of the Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Concerning the
Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (Feb. 6,
1990), http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/mou/mitigate.htm.
156. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.70-.77 (2007).
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of technology-based requirements for permits rather than a true demand for
information.
b. Supply Provisions
The EPA's guidelines contain very few information supply provisions. The major
provision affecting the supply of information is the provision of the Corps's
regulations that specifies the information that must be included in a permit
application. 157 The Corps's regulation thus generates supply. It also limits supply by
precluding the Corps from requiring the applicant to furnish additional information
unless the district engineer deems it "essential" to making a determination under the
guidelines. 158 Another supply provision encourages the supply of information on
cumulative effects. The EPA's guidelines provide that cumulative effects "should be
predicted to the extent reasonable and practical" and that "[t]he permitting authority
shall collect information and solicit information from other sources about the
cumulative impacts on the aquatic ecosystem."1
59
Also relevant to the supply of information is how the regulations allocate the burden
of going forward and the burden of persuasion. Under the permitting scheme, by
definition, the applicant bears the burden of going forward. The applicant must submit
an application that contains the information specified by the Corps's regulations. This
allocation of the burden to the applicant means that the party with access to the site and
to relevant information about the proposed activity also has an incentive to generate
adequate information to enable the Corps to make necessary determinations. 160 This is
a strength of the guidelines. Another provision that affects the supply of information is
found in 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(1), which specifies that the Corps is required to
determine the completeness of each application within fifteen days of receipt. 161 An
application is deemed complete when sufficient information is received to issue a
public notice.162
On balance, it is unclear how well-tailored these supply provisions are for supplying
the volume of detailed information that is demanded under the EPA guidelines'
substantive standards. The information required in the application does not include
much of the information contemplated by the guidelines, but instead focuses largely on
providing a description of the proposed activity-with few information demands
related to the ecosystem impacts. The Corps has authority to require the applicant to
submit any information that the Corps deems essential. As a result, the Corps can and
does request substantial additional information in order to make the detailed
assessment of potential adverse effects required under the guidelines. In light of the
limited information required in the application, it seems likely that the Corps must rely
on agency resources-including databases, maps, and other information-to determine
157. The information required of an applicant is set forth in the Corps's regulations at 33
C.F.R. § 325.1(d) (2007).
158. Id. § 325.1(e).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g)(2) (2007).
160. See Wagner, supra note 2, at 1642.
161. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(1) (2007).
162. Id. § 325.1(d)(9).
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what types of effects may warrant further information requests. These determinations
are largely based on the location of a given project.
Two additional provisions seem to make the supply provisions of the guidelines
discretionary with the Corps. 40 C.F.R. § 230.6, tiled "Adaptability," makes clear that
the extent of the information and analysis required for a proposal will depend on the
particular nature and scale of the activity proposed:
The manner in which these Guidelines are used depends on the physical,
biological, and chemical nature of the proposed extraction site, the material to be
discharged, and the candidate disposal site, including any other important
components of the ecosystem being evaluated. Documentation to demonstrate
knowledge about the extraction site, materials to be extracted, and the candidate
disposal site is an essential component of guideline application.... It is unlikely
that the Guidelines will apply in their entirety to any one activity, no matter how
complex. It is anticipated that substantial numbers of permit applications will be
for minor, routine activities that have little, if any, potential for significant
degradation of the aquatic environment. It generally is not intended or expected
that extensive testing, evaluation or analysis will be needed to make findings of
compliance in such routine cases. 163
This same discretion not to require the applicant to supply information is echoed in the
introductory paragraph of § 230.10, which states that "[a]lthough all requirements in §
230.10 must be met, the compliance evaluation procedures will vary to reflect the
seriousness of the potential for adverse impacts on the aquatic ecosystems posed by
specific dredged or fill material discharge activities." 64
These two sections appear to reflect a sensible impulse to lessen the information
burden created by the substantive guidelines, and not to require extensive
documentation for a case involving extremely minor impacts. The agency retains
discretion to enforce the applicant's duty to supply relevant information, but these
moderating provisions also make the information supply under the guidelines
exceedingly uncertain and unenforceable by a third party. The adaptability regulation
assumes that Corps staff will distinguish "routine" cases. 165 In seeming contrast to the
restriction of discharges in § 230.1, § 230.6 assumes that "substantial numbers" of
permit applications will have little, if any, potential for significant degradation, and
thus the applicant's burden to supply information should be correspondingly
reduced. 166
Thus the extensive information supply created by the guidelines becomes flexible at
the Corps's discretion, based on an informal determination that information is not
needed. The adaptability regulation is the antithesis of a rigorous information supply
provision: it grants the permit staff discretion to determine the quantity and the quality
of information that is adequate for a particular proposal. This provision seems better
suited to an internal agency manual-to ensure that staff avoid unnecessary
documentation. But as a regulatory provision governing permit issuance, it eliminates
provisions of the guidelines that would otherwise assure enforceability of or
163. 40 C.F.R. § 230.6(a) (2007).
164. Id. § 230.10.
165. Id. § 230.6(a).
166. Id.
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accountability for the information supply. This elimination invites the Corps's staff to
deviate from the guidelines at their discretion. In accordance with § 230.6, the Corps
seems to be able to make information requests on an ad-hoc basis with very little
guidance. 
167
c. Consequences Provisions
The ultimate impact of information demand and supply is determined by the
consequences that result when information demands are not met. Several provisions in
the guidelines determine the consequences of an information gap, but the picture that
emerges from these provisions is murky.
i. The Conflict Among § 230.1, § 230.10, and § 230.12(a)(3)(iv)
To begin with the most explicit provision, § 230.12(a)(3)(iv) clearly sets forth the
required outcome where there is not "sufficient information" to determine whether a
discharge complies with the guidelines. 168 This provision directs that where "[t]here
does not exist sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as to whether the
proposed discharge will comply with these Guidelines," the Corps must specify that
the proposed activity fails to comply with the guidelines.
Under this provision, the consequence of inadequate information is denial of a
permit. Thus, the applicant's incentive to supply all necessary information is
reinforced. This appears to be well designed to ensure the statutory goal of avoiding
unacceptable degradation of wetlands by embodying a precautionary approach. In the
absence of adequate information to determine the effects of an activity, the activity will
not go forward. This also seems consistent with the presumption of § 230.1 against the
permitting of discharges unless there is a finding of no unacceptable adverse effects.
In addition to this explicit consequences provision, the allocation of the burden of
persuasion can determine the consequences of inadequate information. Earlier, I noted
that the burden of persuasion under the guidelines' core standards in § 230.1 0(a)-(d)
falls on the Corps if it seeks to engage the prohibitions of that section, or to any party
opposing the permit. So, for example, the text of § 230.10(c) seems to prohibit
issuance of a permit only when and if the Corps makes an affirmative finding that the
proposed activity will cause significant degradation. 169 It is difficult to square this
regulation with the clear force of § 230.1 and § 230.12(a)(3)(iv), which suggest that no
discharge should be permitted in the absence of adequate information. Regardless of
these sections, § 230.10(c) seems to constrain the Corps's permitting authority only
upon an affirmative finding of significant adverse effects.
The tension can be seen in the following hypothetical examples. Suppose that the
Corps staff were to determine that, notwithstanding information requests to the
167. Id.
168. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv).
169. See id. § 230.10(c). On its face 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) would also seem to require an
affirmative finding as to the existence of practicable alternatives. However, as is described in
more detail below, the burden with respect to proving the existence of a practicable alternative
is shifted to the applicant in certain cases, although it may be shifted back upon a sufficient
demonstration by the applicant. See infra Part III.B.l(c)(ii).
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applicant, 170 information on the substrate of the disposal site was missing that would
preclude a determination of how the discharge would affect the substrate. On these
facts, § 230.12 would dictate that the discharge not be permitted. Suppose instead,
however, that the applicant has supplied all specifically identified information about
the substrate requested by the Corps, but because of the limits of scientific
understanding about the particular type of substrate at the site, the Corps cannot
affirmatively conclude that the discharge "will cause or contribute to significant
degradation."' 7 1 Should the Corps approve the permit because it lacks sufficient
information under § 230.10(c) to conclude that the discharge will contribute to
significant degradation? Or should the Corps deny the permit on the grounds that
"[tihere does not exist sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as to
whether the proposed discharge will comply" with the guidelines? 1
72
The answer to these questions depends in part on the definition of "information" as
it is used in § 230.12. Does information mean only specifically identified data? Or does
§ 230.12 also dictate the regulatory outcome in the event of scientific uncertainty
caused by something other than a failure of the applicant to provide requested data?
The answer to these questions has potentially enormous significance for the force of
section 404. If information is narrowly defined as specifically requested data, then the
burden of scientific uncertainty weighs against conservation and in favor of discharges.
If it is broadly defined to include any information needed to complete the relevant
inquiries, then the section 404 guidelines seem to incorporate a precautionary
principle: discharges are prohibited in the face of uncertainty.
The fact that these fundamental questions lurk almost unnoticed in the regulations
and have apparently not been resolved through litigation may be significant. First,
because the issue is not obvious, it is likely that the Corps resolves it implicitly in
practice. Thus it may wield a powerful, non-obvious, and unreviewed discretion that
determines the regulatory consequences of inadequate information where the
inadequacy arises from scientific uncertainty. If the Corps has followed a
precautionary approach, one would expect that decisions denying permits would cite
scientific uncertainty on particular issues as the relevant information deficiency. 1
73
Regardless of the interpretation given to § 230.12, however, the fundamental
precept of § 230.1 dictates that no permit should be granted unless it can be
demonstrated that the discharge "will not have an unacceptable adverse impact" either
individually or cumulatively. 174 This provision seems to independently impose the
burden on the applicant to prove no unacceptable adverse effect will result. It also
makes denial of a permit the consequence of insufficient information, including cases
where the insufficiency results from scientific uncertainty. However, § 230.1 suffers
from its own interpretive issues. Specifically, the prerequisite finding that triggers the
prohibition is "unacceptable" adverse impacts. The modifier "unacceptable" introduces
170. See generally id. § 230.11 (g)(2) (describing how the permitting authority should collect
information in order to make an accurate prediction of the cumulative effects that the discharge
of dredged or fill materials will have on the aquatic ecosystem).
171. Id. § 230.10(c).
172. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv).
173. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, a study of Corps permitting decisions
could determine whether this in fact occurs.
174. 40C.F.R. § 230.1(c) (2007).
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a highly normative judgment that leaves the Corps with considerable discretion to
determine when impacts are unacceptable. 1
75
As is noted earlier, the term "unacceptable adverse impact[s]" is defined in
connection with the EPA's power to veto specific disposal sites under section
404(c). 176 However, it is unclear whether this definition should be applied to its use in
the seemingly broader context of § 230.1. The section 404(c) power has been used very
sparingly, and the EPA has certainly not screened every proposed permit or even a
large number of them under section 404(c). The prominence of the fundamental
precept of § 230.1-located in the first section of the guidelines, as well as its
unequivocal text-supports the conclusion that the guidelines contemplate that it will
be broadly applied to screen all discharges. These facts suggest that the section 404(c)
definition may not be relevant; however, it is the only definition of the term in the
guidelines. 177 No matter how the definitional issue is resolved, the Corps seems to
retain the latitude not to enforce the regulatory prohibition when there is an
information gap by narrowly interpreting the term "unacceptable adverse impacts." 
78
ii. Section 230.10(a)
As noted above, § 230.10(a) seems to require an affirmative finding to trigger its
regulatory prohibition. Thus, read in isolation, the consequence of an information gap
under this subsection seems to be that a permit can be granted, and its prohibition is
not engaged. 179 However, § 230.10(a)(3) contains two presumptions that partially
determine the consequences in the event of an information gap. Both of these
presumptions relate to discharges in locations that are deemed to be special aquatic
sites. "Special aquatic sites" is a category of disposal sites that includes, among other
sites, all wetlands. 8 0 The first presumption applies only to activities that are deemed
175. Id.
176. Id. § 231.2(e).
177. If the definition under the EPA's veto regulations is applicable, it constrains the
meaning of unacceptable adverse effects. This regulation defines an unacceptable adverse
impact as an "impact on an aquatic or wetland ecosystem which is likely to result in significant
degradation of municipal water supplies (including surface or ground water) or significant loss
of or damage to fisheries, shellfishing, or wildlife habitat or recreation areas." 40 C.F.R. §
231.2(e) (2006). Thus impacts to municipal water supplies, fisheries, shellfishing, wildlife
habitat, and recreation areas would be the only types of impacts deemed significant. Moreover,
this definition simply echoes § 230.10(c) by referring to "significant degradation." Id. §
231.2(e); see id. § 230.10(c).
178. Id. § 230.1(c).
179. Id. § 230. 10(a).
180. Id. § 230.3(q-1) (defining special aquatic sites).
They are geographic areas, large or small, possessing special ecological
characteristics of productivity, habitat, wildlife protection, or other important and
easily disrupted ecological values. These areas are generally recognized as
significantly influencing or positively contributing to the general overall
environmental health or vitality of the entire ecosystem of a region.
Id. Subpart E of 40 C.F.R. § 230 identifies the following as special aquatic sites: sanctuaries and
refuges, wetlands, mud flats, vegetated shallows, coral reefs, and riffle and pool complexes. Id.
§§ 230.40-.45 (2007).
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
not to be "water dependent," and the second applies to all discharges in special aquatic
sites. Section 230.10(a)(3) provides:
Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a special
aquatic site (as defined in subpart E) does not require access or proximity to or
siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose (i.e., is
not "water dependent"), practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic
sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. In
addition, where a discharge is proposed for a special aquatic site, all practicable
alternatives to the proposed discharge which do not involve a discharge into a
special aquatic site are presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. 1
The first presumption takes effect if the activity is deemed not water dependent. In
this instance, the Corps must presume that practicable alternatives, not in a wetland or
other special aquatic site, exist. The presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the
applicant to prove that no location other than a special aquatic site exists for the
activity. The main effect of this presumption, in terms of information flow, is to define
the consequences of an absence of information about alternatives.
The effect of the second presumption is that any applicant proposing to discharge
into a wetland for a non-water-dependent activity must clearly demonstrate that the
proposed discharge will have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem than would
a discharge into any non-wetland site. This presumption places a burden on the
applicant to clearly demonstrate that discharges into available non-wetlands sites will
have greater adverse impacts on the aquatic ecosystem than a discharge into a wetland,
a seemingly heavy burden. This, in part, explains the characterization of the
alternatives requirement as the steepest hurdle under section 404, and complaints from
regulated entities that the burden of proving the negative-that there are no practicable
alternatives-is an impossible one.' 
82
Thus, absent information on practicable alternatives, permits for discharges into
wetlands should be denied for all non-water-dependent activities unless the applicant
"clearly demonstrates" that no practicable alternatives outside a special aquatic site
exist. Similarly, the Corps should deny any proposal for any discharge in a special
aquatic site-including any wetland-in favor of any practicable alternative outside of
a special aquatic site, unless the applicant satisfies the heavy burden of clearly
demonstrating that this location will cause greater adverse impacts on the aquatic
ecosystem. With these two presumptions in place, discharges into special aquatic sites
should be extremely rare, and almost unheard of for non-water-dependent activities.
Insufficient information to meet the burden results in denial of the permit. 3
However, the force of both of these provisions is potentially limited by the
proponent's leading role in defining the contours of the activity. This power to define
the activity can include the power to define whether or not the activity is water
dependent. Professor Houck's study of Corps practice under § 230.10(a) revealed
instances in which the Corps's deference to the applicant's determination of whether
181. Id. § 230.10(a)(3).
182. See Shutz, supra note 143, at 235-36.
183. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (2007).
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the project was water dependent stripped the presumptions of meaning. I8 The
interpretation of § 230.10(a) documented by Houck often imposed virtually no
constraint on applicants, provided they took care in defining the nature of their
proposed project. '85 However, in other instances, Professor Houck points out that both
the Corps (on administrative appeal) and the courts have reversed permit decisions
where the Corps staff gave excessive deference to the applicant's definition of the
project, thereby unduly confining the universe of alternatives. 8 6
Thus, although the presumptions embedded in § 230.10(a)(3) appear facially to
make an information gap on the relevant questions a mandatory ground for denial, their
effect in practice may be less clear. The malleability of the standards introduced by the
project definition and the determination of what is practicable weaken the force of
these presumptions considerably and make the consequences of an information gap
less certain.
iii. Section 230.10(c)
Like § 230.10(a), § 230.10(c) seems to require an affirmative finding to trigger its
regulatory prohibition. The Corps must find that a discharge will cause or contribute to
"significant degradation" to trigger a denial under this subsection. As a consequences
provision, "significant degradation" contains an important and undefined normative
component as its standard of care: the word "significant." 187 How much data is
adequate to trigger the regulatory prohibition cannot be objectively determined because
the determination depends on how much and what evidence of degradation is deemed
significant. 8 8 Thus, in assessing whether the Corps has information adequate to meet
the guidelines' demand, it must make a normative judgment as to how much and what
kind of degradation qualifies as significant.
The perils of imposing this type of trans-scientific decision on agencies has been
well documented. 189 Because the Corps handles thousands of individual permitting
184. Houck, supra note 142, at 788. See also Pittman & Waite, supra note 113 (quoting John
Hall, the former head of the Corps's Florida permit program, describing the same phenomenon
based on his own experience).
185. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, FiNAL PERMiT, PERINI LAND & DEVELOPMENT Co. 2-3
(1988) (referring to the Squaw Creek resort, California, involving a $100 million ski resort, part
of which is a $4 million golf course of which eleven acres are wetlands; finding that off-site
alternatives for the golf course did not meet the applicant's purpose or need); Houck, supra note
142, at 785 (citing Brief for Appellant, Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 88-15376
(9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1988)) (demonstrating how, under Corps guidance, an applicant could avoid
any consideration of alternatives simply by defining the project as a "four seasons destination
resort" rather than as a golf course owned and operated by a ski resort).
186. See Houck, supra note 142, at 795-97, 801-02, 804-07.
187. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2007).
188. Neither the term "degradation" nor the term "significant" is defined in the guidelines.
Nonetheless, both the statute and the guidelines shed light on what constitutes degradation in the
guidelines' extensive provisions describing "possible loss of values" to various ecosystems and
components of the ecosystem and in the overall purposes of the CWA, respectively. See id. §§
230.20-.54.
189. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029,1064 (1997); Wagner, supra
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decisions, the difficulty of ensuring uniformity in interpreting this important and
undefined term, and of ensuring careful and distinct handling of factual and normative
questions, is compounded. This normative standard creates the opportunity to blur
scientific and policy judgments, permitting the agency to disguise or ignore an
information shortfall, or to fail to enforce the mandatory consequences of information
that is supplied. Thus, it becomes difficult to enforce the consequences that should
flow from an information shortfall, and the decision makers' accountability is reduced.
Once again, the decision on what consequences will flow from an information shortfall
depends in significant measure on the Corps's discretion.
2. The Corps's Public Interest Regulations
a. Demand
The Corps's regulations create a broad demand for information arising from its
public interest review. However, the demand differs substantially from the provisions
of the water quality guidelines because the Corps's regulations do not even purport to
set a threshold or standard to govern permit issuance or denial. The regulations
provide:
The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the
probable impacts including cumulative impacts of the proposed activity and its
intended use on the public interest. Evaluation of the probable impact which the
proposed activity may have on the public interest requires a careful weighing of
all those factors which become relevant in each particular case. The benefits which
reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced against
its reasonably foreseeable detriments. The decision whether to authorize a
proposal, and if so, the conditions under which it will be allowed to occur, are
therefore determined by the outcome of the general balancing process. 190
Thus the regulation makes issuance or denial of a permit contingent on the outcome
of a balancing process. In terms of information demand, this differs critically from a
provision that sets a standard of care that must be met for permit issuance. In place of a
single standard, the balancing test creates two distinct categories of information:
information on benefits and information on detriments. There is no absolute threshold
of information that the Corps must possess on benefits or detriments to support a
determination. Rather the only relevant inquiry is the relative strength of the
information in the two categories. Thus, there is no absolute demand for information as
a precursor to a regulatory decision granting or denying a permit under the public
interest test.
On the one hand, because there are no absolute information demands and the Corps
retains very broad discretion, the public interest review should not impede the Corps
from making decisions that achieve the purposes of the statute. On the other hand,
leaving the Corps with such broad discretion reduces agency accountability through
judicial review. Moreover, some of the factors that the Corps includes in its public
interest review are carried over from its pre-section-404 "public interest review" and
note 2, at 1623-24.
190. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2007).
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are not consistent with the mandate of section 404(b)(1).' 9' For example, although the
criteria Congress directed the Corps to apply in section 403(c) include economics,
section 403(c) requires consideration of how degradation caused by a discharge may
affect economic interests, not consideration of the economic value of the activity
causing the discharge. Similarly, considerations of property ownership are not
mentioned in section 403(c). Thus, the public interest review inherently tips the
balance away from avoiding unacceptable adverse impacts and in favor of allowing
discharges. This is done by giving weight to the economic value of the activity
associated with the proposed discharge and the interests of property ownership.
Many of the remaining sections of § 320.4 are what I call pure demand provisions,
which clarify to some extent what evidence may be relevant in a given case. They
describe specific information that is relevant to the Corps's evaluation. 92 A few of
these sections are more than pure demand provisions; they create specific standards
that may partially determine whether issuance of a permit is appropriate, 193 but the
majority merely elaborate what information must be "considered." Those that create
something close to a threshold standard for permit issuance, and therefore an
information demand, are generally phrased in very flexible and qualified terms, leaving
the Corps substantial discretion to determine whether the demand has been met.
94
Moreover, all of these provisions are merely factors that feed into the overall
balancing, so they can presumably be outweighed by other factors in the open-ended
balancing process.
b. Supply
The basic supply provisions applicable to the public interest review are the same as
those that provide information supply under the water quality guidelines. The
information required for a complete permit application is set forth in 33 C.F.R. §
325.1 (d). This regulation expressly places the burden on the applicant to provide all
information the Corps deems essential. Under the EPA's guidelines, this creates an
incentive for the applicant to provide needed information. Here, however, because the
decision-making process is a balancing test, the incentives are slightly altered. As
noted above, the balancing test differs because it does not create any baseline
information demand that must be met before a permit can be granted. The granting of a
191. See Mortimer, supra note 57.
192. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)-(3), (c)-(r) (2007).
193. See id. § 320.4(h) (no permit issued for activity affecting coastal zone without
certification of compliance with coastal zone management program); id. § 320.4(i) (no permit
issued without certification of compliance with Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972). Neither of these creates an independent legal duty; they incorporate preexisting
legal requirements.
194. See, e.g., id. § 320.4(l)(2) ("[D]istrict engineers . . . should avoid to the extent
practicable, long and short term significant adverse impacts associated with the occupancy and
modification of floodplains, as well as the direct and indirect support of floodplain
development, whenever there is a practicable alternative."); id. § 320.4(g)(2) (explaining that
applications to erect protective structures will usually receive favorable consideration); id. §
320.4(g)(3) (noting that proposals creating undue interference with access to, or use of,
navigable waters will generally be denied).
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permit is based on the relative strength of the evidence of benefits and detriments.
Under the water quality regulations, the demand created by the thresholds for permit
issuance, coupled with the consequences of inadequate information, creates the
incentive for the applicant to supply the necessary information. But under the public
interest balancing test, there is no comparably clear demand or similar consequences
that flow from an inadequate supply. Thus, on their face, the regulations do not seem
as well designed to ensure supply.
Moreover, the public interest balancing test implicitly creates two categories of
information: information on benefits of the proposed activity and information on
detrimental effects of the activity. The applicant has every incentive to supply
information about the former, and no incentive to provide information on the latter.
Thus the dynamic created is somewhat similar to that described by Professor Wagner
in the realm of chemical regulation: the incentives to supply information are not well
designed to achieve the protective goals of the statute. 195
Beyond the basic supply generated by the application requirements, several specific
provisions direct or authorize the Corps to collect additional information. 196 These
provisions do not materially alter the relevant information supply scheme, which fails
to assure that the Corps will have necessary information on the detrimental impacts of
a proposed activity. The scheme relies heavily on the Corps identifying the relevant
information on detrimental impacts and requesting it from the applicant.
c. Consequences
The consequences of an information shortfall are primarily determined by the
structure of the public interest review as a balancing test. As noted above, this creates
two categories of information, and the regulatory outcome is determined not by the
absolute sufficiency of the information to meet a regulatory standard. Instead, the
outcome is determined by the relative weight of the evidence. Because there is no
absolute quantum of information required to grant or to deny a permit, there is no risk
that the information will be inadequate to meet such a demand, unless the applicant
fails to provide information specifically requested by the Corps.
The task of assessing the relative weight of the information on benefits and
detriments under 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) demands the exercise of considerable
judgment by the Corps. The list of factors is so broad and extensive that it creates
tremendous latitude for the Corps to exercise its judgment, thereby lessening the
importance of the quantum of information on a given point. The regulation provides:
That decision should reflect the national concern for both protection and
utilization of important resources. All factors which may be relevant to the
proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those
are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns,
195. Wagner, supra note 2, at 1680-82.
196. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (2007) (stating that district engineers will consult with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service); id. § 320.4(q)
(explaining that district engineers may make an independent review of the need for the project
from the perspective of the overall public interest in place of the usual assumption concerning
the economic benefit of the proposed activity).
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wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain
values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply
and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production,
mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and
welfare of the people. 197
The tremendously diverse nature of the factors for consideration means that the
"balancing" process is of necessity an extremely imprecise exercise of discretion.
Some of these values, such as conservation, aesthetics, general environmental
concerns, wetlands, fish and wildlife values, land use, shore erosion and accretion,
water quality, safety, considerations of property ownership and the needs and welfare
of the people, may be extremely difficult to quantify. Others, such as historic
properties, floodplain values, navigation, recreation, water supply and conservation,
energy needs, food and fiber production, and mineral needs, may be quantifiable to
some degree, although the effort to convert all of them to a single metric-such as
dollars-will inevitably create uneven results. Clearly, these numerous factors can be
"balanced" in only the crudest sense.
The Corps's inherent discretion in performing the balancing under § 320.4(a)(1) is
reinforced by § 320.4(a)(3) which provides:
The specific weight of each factor is determined by its importance and relevance
to the particular proposal. Accordingly, how important a factor is and how much
consideration it deserves will vary with each proposal. A specific factor may be
given great weight on one proposal, while it may not be present or as important on
another. However, full consideration and appropriate weight will be given to all
comments, including those of federal, state, and local agencies, and other experts
on matters within their expertise. 198
Thus, apart from requiring the Corps to give full consideration to comments, the
regulations leave the Corps to decide the appropriate weight to give to comments and
to each factor. The Corps is generally required to consider all relevant factors, but this
is hardly specific guidance.
Thus, the very structure of the public interest review, while making a massive
amount of information potentially relevant and appropriate for consideration, does not
create an information threshold. The decision to grant or to deny a permit ultimately is
not affected by how much or how little information is available on any given point.
The only relevant fact is the Corps's highly normative judgment as to whether the
detriments of the proposed activity outweigh the benefits. The regulation specifies two
different allocations of the burden of proof: one that applies generally and one that
applies to wetlands deemed to perform functions important to the public interest. 1 In
either case, if the benefit is great enough, the permit should be granted.
197. Id. § 320.4(a)(1).
198. Id. § 320.4(a)(3).
199. In general a permit will be granted unless the district engineer determines that it will be
contrary to the public interest. This allocates the burden to the Corps to demonstrate that the
detriments outweigh the benefits if it wishes to deny a permit. Id. § 320.4(a)(1). In the case of
discharges into wetlands deemed to perform functions important to the public interest, the
burden is reversed, and no permit will be granted unless the benefits of the proposed activity
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C. The Effect of Information Demand, Supply, and Consequences Provisions on
Achieving the Goals of Section 404
1. The EPA Water Quality Regulations
The image that emerges from the foregoing analysis of the demand, supply, and
consequences provisions of section 404 and the EPA's regulations has both strengths
and weaknesses. Looking first at the strengths, in terms of information demand, the
regulations set out extremely detailed information demands the substance of which
seems very closely correlated to the goal of avoiding unacceptable degradation of
aquatic ecosystems. The scope and content of the demands seem comprehensive and
relevant. The core factual prerequisites for permit denial focus on avoiding
degradation, reinforcing the demand for relevant information.
From an information supply standpoint, as well, the generally applicable regulations
seem well designed to achieve the statutory goal and meet the extensive information
demands. The regulations impose a duty on the applicant to provide certain
information in the application, and they also provide the Corps with authority to
require submission of any further information deemed essential to the permit decision.
The applicant bears the burden of going forward, thus providing the applicant an
incentive to supply the necessary information. These provisions create incentives for
the applicant to supply relevant information, and the applicant is the party most likely
to have access to necessary data and the resources to collect the information. 2°° The
Corps also has authority to require the applicant to provide additional essential
information.
As far as the consequences of a lack of information, the presumptions embodied in
§ 230.1 and § 230. 10(a)(3) appear on their face to be well designed to achieve the goal
of avoiding unacceptable impacts by dictating that permits should be denied if there is
inadequate information. 20 1 Moreover, the explicit rule of § 230.12(a)(3)(iv) provides
that in the absence of adequate information, no permit may be granted. 202 Thus, under
these provisions, it appears that the consequences of data gaps are borne by the
proponent of the activity rather than by the agency, avoiding a critical flaw often found
in the realm of chemical regulation. 20 3 Up to this point, these regulations avoid the
pitfalls documented in the realm of chemical regulation. There are substantial
information demands, but they are specific and appropriate to the statutory goal. The
incentives created by the burdens of proof and the explicit supply provisions seem
likely to generate the relevant information. And the consequences of an information
shortfall appear not to undermine the statutory mission of conservation. In the absence
of adequate information, no permit is to be granted, and various presumptions reinforce
this same outcome. The demand provisions seem well designed on the whole, apart
from some lack of clarity.
outweigh the detrimental impacts to the wetlands. Id. § 320.4(b)(4).
200. Cf Wagner, supra note 2, at 1641 (explaining that actors creating negative externalities
in the areas of public health and the environment have an incentive to conceal this information).
201. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1, 230.10(a)(3) (2007).
202. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(iv).
203. See Flournoy, supra note 122, at 385-86.
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Notwithstanding these basic strengths that characterize the information scheme
under the EPA regulations, a more complete analysis reveals numerous provisions that
tend to undermine the strengths of the provisions that affect information supply and
that determine the consequences of an information shortfall. Turning to the supply
provisions, although the regulations require the applicant to furnish a complete
application and authorize the Corps to request further information, the regulations
severely undercut this promising framework in two ways. First, the regulations make
the duty to supply information "adaptable" by the Corps on a case-by-case basis. Thus
the Corps's discretion-not the ample incentives to supply all relevant information
otherwise afforded the applicant under the regulations--determines how much and
what information is in fact supplied by the applicant in a particular case. Second, the
Corps's authority to request supplemental information is limited to cases in which the
information is "essential." On the one hand, allowing the Corps to demand only the
information relevant and necessary to a particular case seems sensible. However, the
incidental effect of both provisions is to reduce the agency's accountability for
ensuring the adequacy of the information supply, and to permit, if not require, the
agency to make subtle, discretionary, and generally unreviewable decisions about what
information should be supplied.
Examining the consequences provisions, the most serious flaws in the information
regime become apparent. There is an unresolved tension between the explicit
consequences provisions of the regulations and the four core standards of the water
quality regulations. The explicit consequences provisions state clearly that no permit
shall be granted where information is insufficient, while the core standards of the water
quality regulations authorize permit denial only if the Corps is able to make certain
findings, which require a certain quantum of evidence.
In addition, undefined or poorly defined standards of care and standards of proof
confer broad discretion on the Corps to determine when information shortfalls exist'
that will trigger consequences. The standards of care under § 230.10(c) and § 230.1
premise regulatory action on findings such as "significant" degradation and
"unacceptable" adverse effects. 2° 4 The standards of care form part of the mechanism
that determines the consequences of an information shortfall. By employing undefined
normative terms as the standards that distinguish permissible from impermissible
conduct, the EPA has assigned the Corps an important role in determining how much
and what information is needed to trigger the regulatory prohibition. In other words,
the EPA has given the Corps considerable discretion to determine whether sufficient
information on adverse effects exists to support a denial. Thus, there is less clarity and
more discretion afforded the Corps. This raises a concern as to whether even the most
conservation-minded staffer would feel exposed and vulnerable deeming degradation
"significant" when (1) there is no guidance on what that term means, (2) the only party
to the proceeding has a strong incentive to appeal any denial, and (3) no other party is
present to argue in favor of conservation.
When one considers the considerable discretion that the regulations afford the
Corps over both information supply and the consequences that flow from an
information gap--in light of the Corps's history and record, and the one-party nature
of most permit proceedings-this seems to be a recipe for disaster. There is long-
204. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10(c), 230.1 (2007).
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standing criticism of Congress's decision to assign regulation of dredging and filling to
an agency that is "far and away the leading dredger in the nation." 20 5 The conflict
between the agency's historic mission promoting navigation and the conservation
mission inherent in section 404 makes an information structure that is highly
dependent on the Corps's exercise of normative judgment seem unwise and unlikely to
assure that any particular degree of degradation will be prevented.
Moreover, recent accounts of the culture and practice within the Corps are not
encouraging. Former staff from the Jacksonville District have described the section
404 program as "a huge scam" and "a make-believe program.,, 206 These and other
comments suggest an agency that is grossly understaffed 20 7 and under substantial
political pressure to grant permits, and to do so without delay. 208 A Corps employee
from the Tampa Office explained that "[t]he regulatory program doesn't say we're out
here to deny permits, . . . It says we're out here to process them.",
20 9
These comments suggest that the Corps's responsibility to require information from
applicants and to exercise discretion to define the threshold for permit issuance may be
incompatible with the policy of avoiding unacceptable degradation under section 404.
The documented pressure on the Corps to speed the process and to grant permits-
coming from both applicants and elected officials--coupled with the Corps's historic
mission to promote navigation (specifically dredging), all create pressure on the Corps
to employ the adaptability regulation to limit the applicant's duty to supply information
and, in close cases, to find that impacts do not meet the standard of significance.
2. The Corps's Public Interest Regulations
The information regime created by the Corps's public interest balancing test creates
a unique dynamic. As a part of the balancing test, the regulations create a demand for
two distinct categories of information. Like the EPA guidelines, the applicant
technically has the burden to provide all essential information. This creates an
incentive for the applicant to provide information and, seemingly, to assure supply.
However, this incentive is offset by the fact that the review entails merely a balancing
test, not a determination of the adequacy of the information to meet some threshold
standard. Thus, there are no specific consequences that flow from an absolute
205. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.12, at 185
(2000); Blumm, supra note 33, at 412.
206. Pittman & Waite, supra note 113.
207. See id. (comments of Schnepel and Hall).
208. Craig Pittman & Matthew Waite, Pressure for Permission: Vanishing Wetlands, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 23, 2005, at IA (describing numerous cases of political pressure to
approve and speed up decisions on permits); see also Derek Catron, Wetlands Under Siege,
DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J., Jan. 27, 2002, at IA. Some accounts report that the pressure not to
slow development down or anger developers has produced a regulatory culture that views the
applicants as "customers" to whom the Corps sends customer satisfaction surveys. Pittman &
Waite, supra note 113. The net result is that the mission of protecting waters from degradation
for the public, which usually has no active proponent in the process, becomes secondary to the
mission of processing applications for the vocal and actively-involved developers who seek
permits.
209. Pittman & Waite, supra note 113.
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information shortfall, lessening the incentive for the applicant to provide information
unless the Corps specifically demands it.
Moreover, the relevant information falls into two distinct categories: benefits of the
proposed discharge (which are favorable to the applicant) and costs of the discharge
(which are unfavorable). Therefore, the applicant has an incentive to provide
information on one category of relevant information (benefits) and a disincentive to
provide information on adverse effects or costs. The combination of the lack of any
clear consequences in the event of an information gap and the applicant's differential
incentive to provide positive and adverse information about a project does not seem
well designed to generate the information needed to ensure that unacceptable
degradation does not occur.
CONCLUSION
The specific information demands created by the section 404 program appear to be
appropriate. However, the provisions that should generate a supply of information
leave the Corps with considerable interpretive latitude to determine how much
information will be supplied. The provisions affecting information supply harness the
applicant's motivation by imposing an open-ended duty on the applicant to provide all
information deemed essential by the permitting agency and assigning the burden of
going forward to the applicant. Thus, the scheme provides strong incentives for the
applicant to generate or acquire all information demanded by the agency. However,
this seemingly sound supply is undercut by the adaptability provision, which makes all
but the minimal supply generated by the initial application discretionary at the behest
of the permitting agency. The result is an uncertain supply, determined on an ad hoc
basis by the Corps. An applicant's differential incentive to supply favorable and
unfavorable information for the Corps's public interest review also seems likely to
distort the information supply. Thus, the program fails to capitalize on the inherent
advantage of a permitting process that places the burden of going forward on the
applicant, which tends to ensure information supply.
Among the provisions that dictate the consequences of an information shortfall, the
standards of care found in the core provisions of the EPA's water quality regulations
and in the extremely open-ended balancing approach under the Corps's public interest
review afford the Corps broad discretion to determine whether there is an information
shortfall. By assigning the Corps discretion to interpret these key normative standards,
the guidelines leave open the possibility that the Corps will issue permits despite
evidence of degradation, which is incompatible with the purposes of the Clean Water
Act, by relying on its almost unreviewable judgment that the evidence does not reach
the "significance" threshold or by invoking its judgment on whether adverse effects
outweigh the benefits of a proposed discharge.
Moreover, various provisions dictate inconsistent consequences in the event of an
information shortfall. Some suggest that inadequate information must always lead to a
permit denial, but others place a burden on the agency to make specific findings as a
basis for a permit denial. This would seem to leave the Corps broad discretion to
dictate outcomes simply by selecting which provision to invoke as the basis for its
decision.
In sum, the potential problems created by the information regime under the section
404 permit program differ significantly from those typically found under a health-
protective regulatory regime. The problem is not paralysis caused by excessive data
20081
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demands and inadequate supply. Rather, the regulatory regime grants the Corps
substantial discretion to determine both what information will be supplied and what
consequences will attend an information shortfall. Undefined normative standards of
care, seemingly inconsistent provisions regarding the consequences of an information
shortfall, and a broad grant of discretion to the Corps to determine what information
should be supplied all leave much of the impact of the information regime uncertain, to
be resolved on a case by case basis by the Corps. Despite several provisions that seem,
on their face, to ensure a precautionary approach that will prevent issuance of a permit
in the face of inadequate information, the net result is that the information regime fails
to ensure that the agency will have the information it needs and that the goals of
avoiding unacceptable degradation will be achieved in cases with inadequate
information.
